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Security is a complex issue for organisations, with its management now a fiduciary responsibility 
as well as a moral one. Organisational security, such as computer security, human security, access 
control, risk management etc.; is conducted in separate business units creating a silo effect. A co-
hesive and holistic approach is required to mitigate the risk of security breaches and parts of the 
business not monitored by any silo. Without a holistic robust structure, the assets of an organisa-
tion are at critical risk. Enterprise architecture (EA) is a strong and reliable structure that has 
been tested and used effectively for designing, building, and managing organisations globally for 
at least 30 years. Grouping security with EA promises to leverage the benefits of EA in the secu-
rity domain.  
Through a review of existing security frameworks this work evaluates the extent to which they 
employ EA and determines there is a need for developing a comprehensive solution. This re-
search designs, develops, evaluates and demonstrates a security EA framework for organisations 
regardless of their industry, budgetary constraints or size. The framework is developed from the 
Zachman framework 2013 Version 3.0 because it is the most complete, most referenced in our 
frameworks review, and historically the methodology that is chosen by others to base their 
frameworks on. The results support the need for a holistic security structure and indicate benefits 
including reduction of security gaps, improved security investment decisions, clear functional re-
sponsibilities and a complete security nomenclature and international security standard compli-
ance among others. This research bridges the gap and changes the way we fundamentally view 
security in an organisation, from individual silo capabilities to a holistic security eco-system with 
highly interdependent primitive security models.   
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In less than one year, between April 2018 and March 2019, there were 964 data breach noti-
fications made under the Australian Notifiable Data Breaches (NDB) scheme by business, 60 per 
cent of which were malicious or criminal attacks. This is a 712 per cent increase in business noti-
fications since the introduction of the NDB scheme and a change in reporting obligations, com-
pared with the previous 12 months under a voluntary scheme (OAIC 2019). These startling sta-
tistics highlight that effective security has never been more important to Australian business and 
therefore individuals (Patterson 2003). However, very few companies have adopted a cohesive 
security strategy that encompasses the protection of all assets whether they be physical, digital or 
cognitive (Roeleven and Broer 2010). Basic online security behaviours are not being practiced by 
Australians and small to medium businesses. The Australian Cyber Security Centre had more 
than 13,672 reports of cybercrime from July to September 2019 and of those 11,461 were of suf-
ficient merit to be referred to Australian law enforcement agencies (ASD 2020).   High profile 
American security breaches such as the Verizon breach releasing more than 14 million customer 
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records1, the WannaCry ransomware computer hack giving access to NSA files2 and the iCloud 
accounts extortion3 highlight the global need for increased security resilience. Most information 
security programs manage each security instance departmentally, e.g. the finance department is 
responsible for risk management, the human resources department is responsible for security 
checks such as clearances, the ICT department is responsible for computer security and the facil-
ities department is responsible for physical security. This approach is a complicated silo approach 
and uses many different security models, leading to duplication of resources, responsibility con-
fusion and parts of the organisation being overlooked entirely (Roberti 2001; Shariati et al. 2011). 
Table 1 provides the common departmental approach to security management. An organisation-
al security framework that includes all aspects of security – information, physical, technical pro-
cess, people, cycles and risk; and has the flexibility of implementation to work with an organisa-
tion’s budget, size and security mechanisms, could be used to mitigate these risks (Angelo 2001; 
Copeland 2017). 
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Table 1. Organisational Security Management Sample 
This work conducted an extensive review of existing security frameworks – 27 in total – and the 
results indicate a comprehensive solution, with all aspects of security equally considered, does 
not exist. The analysis indicates a lack of research process in the development, a disjoint focus in 
either technical or policy, and a department or project focus for the implementation. Of those 
frameworks reviewed with a holistic approach, the most common framework methodology ref-
erenced is Enterprise Architecture (EA)(Fatolahi and Shams 2006; Gokhale 2010).  
EA is a holistic method to guide the enterprise’s people, information, processes and technolo-
gies, to achieve the most effective execution of the corporate vision and strategy (Gorazo 2014).  
An EA structure can reduce unnecessary costs, ad-hoc projects, unintentional reinvention, and 
provide corporate direction and relevance (Bente et al. 2012). The use of EA has a number of 
significant benefits, which include a reduction of IT expenditure, improved process innovation, 
standardised business processes, increase in risk management effectiveness, better strategic plan-
ning and improved business / IT alignment (Boucharas 2010; Haren 2011; Kreizman and 
Robertson 2006; Meyer et al. 2011). EA provides a methodology that reaches all parts of an or-




Computer security (application, network, data, information, e-
commerce, cryptography) 
IT 
Physical security (security guards, locks, fences, gates) Facilities 
Human security (hiring process, security clearance) Human Resources 
Infrastructure security Facilities 
Operational security Project Managers 
Security architecture and design IT 
Access control Facilities 
Business continuity / disaster recover planning Facilities 
Information security governance and risk management IT 
Legal / regulations / compliance Finance or Board of Directors 
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the theory of a complete holistic security model effecting every aspect of business, EA provides 
such a mechanism. The EA benefits also directly address the concerns of a lack of strategic secu-
rity and could be harnessed when employing EA for the design of a security framework.  
Notwithstanding the popularity and recent adoption of EA, the majority of EA frameworks do 
not have a security component (Agarwal et al. 2017; Saint-Louis and Lapalme 2016). The Zach-
man ontological framework (Zachman 1987) is one of the most widely accepted and implement-
ed EA frameworks, however, despite Zachman’s success, it does not include security in any form 
(Zachman 2001). This lack of security has been identified by others (Copeland 2017) who have 
used Zachman to create an enterprise security architecture (ESA). However, the results have 
been limited and none of the ESA’s to date have utilised the Zachman concept of an ontology or 
ensured a strict adherence to the original definitions of Zachman (Zachman 1987). Zachman is 
the ontological language of EA and building on this concept, a security implementation of 
Zachman would be the first security ontology available – a defined organisational security lan-
guage. Furthermore, most existing ESA’s are from business white papers, and thus lack in-depth 
case study analysis, experimental  replicability and research exploration  (Tamm et al. 2011). The 
use of EA in security will also provide a single capture of all the organisation’s security – a holis-
tic security structure that is not yet available in a mature form. 
The resulting research question for this work therefore is: 
Will a holistic security model, using Enterprise Architecture, provide security benefits to an organisation more  
effectively than a piecemeal approach? 
The contributions to practice and knowledge of this research are three fold. Firstly, the extension 
of the Enterprise Architecture Domain – the development of a standardised, comprehensive en-
terprise security architecture. There are some examples of similar research in the literature 
(Ertaul and Sudarsanam 2005; Ho 2002; Sherwood et al. 1995) however, they have a smaller 
scope and their purpose is not to cover the entire spectrum of an organisation. For example EA 
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security governance frameworks tend to be very top heavy – ensuring the highest levels of the 
organisation are fulfilling their legal responsibilities but do not include implementation or tech-
nology (Anderson and Choobineh 2008). Also, most of the writings about enterprise security 
architecture are from business white papers and not from academia (Tamm et al. 2011) thus lack-
ing research rigour. Secondly, the Security Domain – the development of the first fully re-
searched security ontology and ESA based on security industry standards and security regulatory 
compliance and practices. The work is compliant with both NIST 800-53 (NIST 2013) and 
ISO/IEC 27002 (ISO 2013) and will provide an assurance that all aspects or the organisation 
have been considered for security. Finally, the design of a security dimension to the original EA 
framework - Zachman. Previous research which have created a security construct for the Zach-
man framework, have restricted their scope to a specific organisational focus, such as technical, 
instead of considering the organisation as a whole (Kreizman and Robertson 2006). Adherence 
of an ESA to the EA principles from Zachman extends the utility of the Zachman and provides 
a security dimension which has otherwise been lacking (Copeland 2017).  
The opportunity for a reduction of security breaches, increased economic security and cyber re-
silience in organisations through a holistic approach to an organisational security framework with 
methodological supporting documentation, the importance and benefits of which have been 
mentioned in research, needed to be tested (Anderson 2008; Moulton and Coles 2003). This 
work developed a novel, fully researched enterprise security architecture (ESA) framework for 
organisations. The framework, analysed by industry professionals to determine if a holistic secu-
rity model can address the much needed solution to the identified organisational security gaps 
and provide security benefits. The framework, the Security Architecture Framework for Enterprises 
(SAFE), is a comprehensive security solution based on the enterprise architecture methodology. 
The evaluation and analysis, backed by feedback from industry professionals, supports our hy-
pothesis that a holistic security design using EA will provide security benefits to an organisation 
Michelle Graham - Enterprise Security Architecture – Mythology or Methodology 
Dissertation for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy – School of Computer Science, University of Adelaide 
Page 6 
more effectively than a piecemeal approach. This research is a complete security solution and 
provides organisational defence in depth and in the current world climate, what could be more 
necessary to business (Copeland 2017). 
This dissertation, a precis of which was published at ICEIS 2020 (McClintock et al. 2020),  is or-
ganised as follows: 
Background and Literature Review (Chapter 2) 
A literature review, including search parameters, of the relevant domains – security, enterprise 
architecture and enterprise security architecture, is provided including general background rele-
vant to the research, the significance of the research, prior knowledge and an analysis of related 
work. The justificatory knowledge (kernel theory) is included to inform the construction of the 
ESA artifact, as is the design principles developed from the literature review analysis.  
Method (Chapter 3) 
The chapter will discuss the methods used and the sources consulted to meet the research goals.  
This research used the Design Science Research (DSR) methodology to drive the research pro-
ject and is explained in detail including rationale. Other methods selected and discussed include 
Grounded Theory Method for qualitative analysis, an Oppenheim questionnaire for the survey 
of the experts analysing the artifact, and the philosophy and approach of the research which 
were constructivist and inductive. To aid future research, a description of why these choices were 
made and other options were not selected, will also be provided. 
Artifact Description (Chapter 4) 
To describe the ESA artifact, a description of the design search (development) process and pro-
cedures that led to the artifact design is provided as well as a detailed description of the artifact 
itself. For the ESA, three levels of abstraction were developed and each will be provided in detail 
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including how they were developed, the real world application and notable features. The ESA 
was also compliance mapped against security standards and this will be explained.   
Evaluation (Chapter 5) 
The evaluation chapter will include a description of the evaluation tool – an Oppenheim Survey, 
including how the survey questions were developed, written and mapped to the research motiva-
tion; the qualitative analysis process which used Grounded Theory Methodology coding and how 
this provided cyclical results through each coding phase, iterating to a richer data set after each 
phase. The explanation will also demonstrate the chosen evaluations’ utility, validity, quality and 
efficacy (Gregor and Hevner 2013). 
Discussion (Chapter 6) 
The research discussion focuses on the significance and real world applications that have been 
identified from the design evaluation outcomes. The discussion links together the research ques-
tion and design goals to the artifact and show how the novelty of the artifact design has bridged 
the research gap.     
Conclusions (Chapter 7) 
The artifact is an important step forward in finding a comprehensive solution to disparate organ-
isational security solutions and demonstrates that the whole is clearly greater than the sum of its 
parts. This chapter concludes the research with the key findings, noting the artifact demonstrates 
the success of the design and describes future work options to expand and develop the research 
further.  
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2 Background and Literature Review 
 
 
“Words are sacred. They deserve respect. If you get the right ones, in the right order, you 




Enterprise security architecture (ESA) draws from two fields of research – security and en-
terprise architecture. This chapter gives an overview and the background of both the security and 
the enterprise architecture fields and then provides an overview of the work done to date to 
combine these two fields using a semi-systematic literature review. Key design principles were 
captured from the review to inform the development of the artifact and will be discussed in de-
tail.   
2.1 Enterprise Architecture 
The enterprise architecture (EA) domain began with Zachman’s 1987 seminal work  
(Zachman 1987). The paper notates the construction process done by all industries that design, 
engineer, and build large scale objects, e.g., airplanes and buildings.  The notation, or architec-
ture, is then applied to the engineering of organisations. The theory states that an organisation is 
at least as complex as a large construction project and should be engineered using a similar pro-
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cess, namely, one that defines the context, the concept, the design, the build, the implementation and the 
use of the organisation.  EA provides a link between organisational goals and mission statements, 
through the organisational layers, down to the project level, and, similar to an initial engineering 
concept document, it is traceable to a final built product. The organisation’s assets are defined in 
the EA as 1) people, 2) information, 3) process and 4) technology, and these are used to imple-
ment the vision of the organisation. 
Academic rigour and growing research interest in developing EA theory is demonstrated from 
the last three decades with more than 4,000 journal articles and conference papers focusing on 
EA (Gampfer et al. 2018).  
Figure 1 demonstrates how EA interacts with an organisation. The organisation is constructed 
through the language of EA and then the vision is implemented throughout the organisation us-
ing its assets, i.e. the people, information, process and technology. The people of an organisation 
represent any person who interacts with the organisation in any manner e.g., employees, custom-
ers, contractors, vendors, suppliers. Information or data refers to all data that has been generated 
by or given to the organisation in any form whether it be electronic or paper. Process is the way 
a company “does business” and includes processes, policy and procedures. Technology refers to 
the tools that facilitate the business process and store the business data; it is used by the people.  
EA provides a mechanism to link the vision to the rest of the organisation and its assets. 
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Figure 1:  Enterprise Architecture Role in an Organisation 
 
There are many EA frameworks in use by various organisations. The frameworks fall into two 
categories, ontologies and prescriptive methodologies (Gerber et al. 2020; Zachman 2016). An ontology 
or classification structure is a recognised vocabulary used to describe objects in a particular do-
main (Guarino et al. 2009). A prescriptive methodology is explicit in its requirements. Examples 
include describing how to create the artifact, describing what tools should be used, or what arti-
fact should be purchased to be in compliance with the framework. The Zachman framework (see 
Figure 2) is an example of an ontology and is the adopted vocabulary for EA. The Zachman 
framework is also a structure independent of the tools and methods used in any particular busi-
ness. This is useful because it can be adopted by any organisation without the need for specific, 
proprietary tools.  
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Figure 2:  Zachman Enterprise Architecture Framework (Zachman 2008) 
The implementation of the Zachman 6 x 6 framework grid (Figure 2) would require an enter-
prise architect to use all 36 cells of the framework as a guide to describe a complex item like an 
organisation. The cells are called primitive models. Primitive models are the classification name of a 
required element in an EA framework. For example, a primitive model for an organisation’s se-
curity could be “access control”, and an organisation might decide on specific artifacts to fulfil it, 
e.g., security guard, firewall, door locks etc., depending on organisational needs and budget con-
straints.  The rows of the framework are the views of an organisation, for example the executive 
view would be the management of the organisation. The columns are English interrogatives that 
describe the details of each view e.g., the what, how, where, who, when and why of the manage-
ment perspective. The result is a complete explanation of the particular view of the organisation. 
A key principle for the Zachman framework is that a framework row is not an abstraction but a 
transformation, meaning each row is an entirely new view, not a decomposition of an earlier 
view. The ontology is used to organise and categorise the architectural artifacts, which are notat-
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ed in the framework’s grid. The architect works methodically through each row and identifies or 
develops the required architectural artifact(s) (an instance of the cell) for the organisation they 
have chosen to architect. Completion of the artifacts can be executed using existing instances of 
the artifact or created using various methods including a technical writer, or brainstorming or 
conceptualisation techniques. 
In contrast to the Zachman framework, the majority of other frameworks are prescriptive and 
describe how to create the artifacts and the specific tools to use; or they name the instances spe-
cifically, for example a firewall as compared to a network security component. In this case a 
firewall is a specific instance of an implementation, but a network security component allows the 
implementation decision to be made by the organisation. Because these types of frameworks do 
not use ontological conventions, they are often used very effectively in conjunction with the 
Zachman framework. Some examples described below, include the TOGAF (Josey 2009), the 
GEAF (Bittler and Kreizman 2005), the FEAF - described later in this chapter (U.S.Government 
2013) and the DoDAF (DoD 2010).  
The Open Group Architecture Framework (TOGAF) (Josey 2009) is a process driven enterprise 
architecture framework that includes a method and a set of tools. The TOGAF methodology 
divides the organisation into four different architectural areas: 
 Business architecture – a description of the business processes 
 Data architecture – describes how data repositories are stored and used 
 Application architecture - application design descriptions and how they interact with each 
other 
 Technology architecture – describes the supporting software and hardware 
The TOGAF recommends that it can be built in conjunction with such artifact driven frame-
works like the Zachman. The combination of the process and the artifacts make a strong organi-
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sational EA. Chapter 21 of the TOGAF describes the security architecture and the approach is 
to apply policy to the enterprise architecture not have a specifically designed security architec-
ture. 
 The Gartner Enterprise Architecture Framework (GEAF) (Bittler and Kreizman 2005) is de-
scribed as an architecture process model that interacts with architectural frameworks. The Gart-
ner view is that architecture is about environmental trends and strategy not engineering and the 
process driven GEAF reflects this belief. The model describes architecting and documenting re-
quirements, principles and models to move an organisation from the present to their desired fu-
ture state. This model does not include security however Gartner have created the Gartner Enter-
prise Information Security Architecture. 
The Department of Defense Architecture Framework (DoDAF) (DoD 2010) is an overarching 
supporting framework to support decision making for all managers in the United States Depart-
ment of Defense through sharing of information – organised data. The second version of the 
DoDAF moved the framework away from its original focus of architectural artifacts and prod-
ucts to architecture data and its collection, store and structures. Data is visualised through mod-
els and when completed become views and collectively viewpoints. The framework continues to 
work effectively with NIST 800-53 (NIST 2010) – the U.S.A. Federal Government’s security 
framework.   
Perhaps indicative of its historical importance, most frameworks, including the TOGAF, GEAF, 
FEAF and DoDAF, actually have their origins in the Zachman framework, which is why they 
complement and are used effectively with the Zachman framework. The following discussion 
provides a detailed explanation of the rows and columns in the Zachman framework (Figure 2). 
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Audience Perspectives / Stages of Reification 
The perspectives or rows of the Zachman framework constitute a complete way to view an or-
ganisation from the people who would initially identify the business concept (the first row) to the 
final instantiation of the running organisation (the final row). Each stage or row of the reification 
process, moving down the framework, is a transformation rather than a more detailed view of 
the previous perspective – that is, it is a completely separate view that is not reliant or evolved 
from the previous view. 
Executive Perspective / Identification (Row 1) 
The executive perspective is defined at the inception of a company, generally at the Board of Di-
rectors level. It is the identification of the concept for the business and is externally focused. The 
definition indicates the boundaries of where the enterprise will sit in the market or operating 
domain. The interrogatives in this row provide detailed lists of these boundaries including re-
sponsibilities, processes, motivation and timings. Row 6 is the business implementation of this 
perspective. 
Business Management Perspective / Definition (Row 2) 
The business management perspective is internally focused in that it defines the executive, exter-
nal concept for the enterprise, into a business model of enterprise design and operational reality. 
This is used by the enterprise to implement the logical depiction into the building blocks of the 
enterprise. 
Architect Perspective / Representation (Row 3) 
The architect perspective represents the business model as the required pieces or building blocks 
of the enterprise and indicates how they will interact with each other. At this point, such consid-
erations as high level technology categories e.g. database; and the alignment to business of that 
technology, are identified for the purpose of turning the ideas from the business management 
perspective into an organisational reality. The concepts from Row 2 are now more formalized. 
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Engineer Perspective / Specification (Row 4) 
The requirements and specifications of the systems of the organisation are designed at the engi-
neering perspective. It is the creation of the detailed designs, which will transform and imple-
ment the conceptual building blocks – the physical depiction of the earlier logical descriptions. 
The designs can include such detail as nodes and edges, operating systems and middleware. 
Technician Perspective / Configuration (Row 5) 
The technician perspective is the business component level. The detailed designs of the organisa-
tion from Row 4 are implemented using specific tooling configurations.  
Enterprise Perspective / Instantiation (Row 6) 
The enterprise perspective is the instantiation of the reification process from Row 1 to 5, out-
worked and demonstrated in the functioning organisation. At this stage of the framework, the 
artifacts are the actual organisation not the architectural abstractions like the previous five rows. 
Classification Names 
What – Things (Column 1) 
The “what” is the inventory sets of the organisation, that is, the sets of things that are tracked 
and managed for the organisation to function. This can be in the form of people or information 
and governs how these inventory items are defined, represented, specified and configured. The 
inventory models are explained pictorially in terms of the entity itself and the relationships be-
tween the entities (the enterprise inventories of assets). 
How – Process (Column 2) 
The “how” refers to the processing of the organisation through various process types. At this 
point the definition, representation, specification and configuration of the processes are created 
enterprise transformations. The processes provide the transformation models of the assets from 
the inputs and outputs of the organisation and are depicted using process flows. 
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Where – Location (Column 3) 
Distribution networks depicted using network models are the “where”. The distribution type for 
the inventories, including business location, system location, technology location or tool loca-
tion, provide the network with the operations locations and connections. It is particularly im-
portant for Column 3 to map its relationship with the other columns as it provides the network 
maps that the other columns feed into – including data, processing and logic or enterprise stor-
age, transportation or transmission capacities.  
Who – People (Column 4) 
The responsibility assignments are allocated to the organisational stakeholders in Column 4 – the 
“who”. Those who are responsible are identified (note this can be both internal and external e.g. 
staff and clients), their roles are defined, represented, specified and configured. The overall view 
of this is an enterprise work performance model. The roles and the work products of those roles 
are present in the functioning organisation and the defined responsibilities are often used for 
managing performance. Because of the nature of the “who” – that is people; there is no standard 
notation for representing the information from Column 4, with the exception of organisational 
charts and workflow models. Also, some modern organisations tend to have globalisation issues 
due to the new nature of an international workforce. 
When – Events (Column 5) 
The “when” is about timing cycles, the intervals and moments of the organisation and how those 
are identified as types, defined, represented, specified and configured within the architecture and 
the organisation. The timing instantiations of Column 5 are the operations intervals and mo-
ments and are often represented as distance (due to globalisation effects), relative time or operat-
ing hours. These dynamic models are the enterprise cycle times. 
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Why – Ends (Column 6) 
The motivations of the organisation can be found in Column 6 – “why”. The objectives and 
strategies explain why the organisation is in business, how those motivations and intentions are 
outworked through ends and means. The thoughtful values or enterprise objectives from this 
column will drive the organisation through issues and decision making cycles. The motivation 
models are described using definitions, representations, specifications and configurations. 
Model Names 
The model names, indicated in the right hand edge column of Figure 2, describe how the views 
are modelled (pictorially) for explanation purposes. Each of the columns in the framework (indi-
cated in Column 1 of Table 2) is represented by a particular type. Like data types in program-
ming, enterprise architecture has six types to describe content. The types and the corresponding 
column are described in Table 2.  
Column Name Enterprise Architecture Type Example Data for Executive Perspective 
What Inventory Product types 
How Process Forecast sales 
Where Distribution Parts distribution network 
Who Responsibility General management 
When Timing Market cycle 
Why Motivation Revenue growth 
Table 2:   Enterprise architecture types by column (Zachman 2008) 
The models are created for the audience perspective (see Table 3). For example, an executive 
would want to identify the scope contexts during the execution of their role because this will give 
them the most strategic level of knowledge for the executive to make decisions for the organisa-
tion. An architect would identify all types for each audience as indicated in the Example Data 
from Table 2. The outcome is a complete set of data for all 36 cells of Figure 2. 
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Row (Audience) Model Name Perspective 
Executive Perspective Scope Contexts Identification 
Business Perspective Business Concepts Definition 
Architect Perspective System Logic Representation 
Engineer Perspective Technology Physics Specification 
Technician Perspective Tool Components Configuration 
Enterprise Perspective Operation Instances Instantiations 
Table 3:   Enterprise architecture models by row perspectives (Zachman 2008) 
Enterprise Names 
The final row in Figure 2 is the Enterprise Names. These are the aggregated names for all six 
data sets of each interrogative column. For example, the six rows of the How column are organi-
sational processes for all six perspectives and the group name for the six is Process Flows. 
Therefore, this column indicates the process flows of the organisation. The other aggregated en-
terprise names are Inventory Sets, Distribution Networks, Responsibility Assignments, Timing 
Cycles and Motivation Intentions.   
Zachman and Security 
In 2001, John Zachman wrote a paper about the intersection of security and EA (Zachman 
2001). His key perspective is that his framework already supports security and does not need any 
additions. He is purporting role-based security and focuses on the technical implementation of 
security, particularly recommending the combination of EA and positive identification of indi-
viduals accessing the enterprise as the essence of organisational security. The paper also provides 
a discussion directing the external interfaces of the enterprise to encrypt files and provides two 
technical security architectures; “Systems Centric Approach” or “User Centric Approach”. Both 
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related to the placement of the security technologies within the system that is consistent with his 
recommendation for physical access control and encryption of files leaving the organisation. Fi-
nally, Zachman states: “I probably don’t have to make this observation, but Security is only one 
benefit (and only one rather incidental benefit at that) to having Enterprise Architecture.”  
Since the publication of this paper, Zachman has remained quiet on the topic of security and left 
it to security professionals who agree that organisational security is infinitely complex (Juntunen 
and Virta 2019) and requires all aspects of an organisation to begin with security in mind to 
achieve organisational security in depth and security resilience (Crossler et al. 2017).   
2.2 Security 
Since the first virus named "Brain", in 1986 (Highland 1988), and the Morris Worm in 1988 
(Orman 2003), information security has become essential for organisations everywhere. Through 
the 1990s the security approaches were ad hoc and reactionary (Chaisiri and Ko 2016) however, 
it is now clear that more thoughtful methodologies are required to maintain a secure defence 
(Shariati et al. 2011). At the same time, the societal uptake of computing has enabled cyber-
corporate espionage, providing companies with tangible reasons for the security of their organi-
sations, namely the protection of the assets. 
The need for organisational security initially began with the protection of information stored on 
computers and the physical security of organisations however, this has broadened to include all 
departments within an organisation. As the organisation has evolved, most departments have 
retained individual control over the security matters they have put in place. This implies that each 
security solution is managed separately, which results in a lack of a cohesive strategy (Eloff and 
Eloff 2005). Some of the most common yet individually managed security implementations to-
day are: 
 Computer security (application, network, data, information, e-commerce, cryptography) 
 Physical security (security guards, locks, fences, gates) 
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 Human security (hiring process, security clearance) 
 Infrastructure security 
 Operational security 
 Security architecture and design 
 Access control 
 Business continuity / disaster recover planning 
 Information security governance and risk management 
 Legal / regulations / compliance 
Holistic frameworks for organisational security, which is those that view the organisation’s secu-
rity holistically rather than each security instance separately, are limited. One example is govern-
ance frameworks that are defined by the IT Governance Institute (ITGI 2001) as the “set of re-
sponsibilities and practices exercised by the board and executive management”.  However, gov-
ernance frameworks focus on management fulfilling their legal requirements, which does include 
security. But they do not address security any lower in the organisation than management.  
The other most common response to organisational security has a technical focus such as com-
puter and information security (Anderson 2001). Unfortunately, it is still very common for a 
company to believe that organisational security is solely about virus defence and firewalls. When 
asked, most do not include broader security mechanisms in their definitions of security, other 
than computer security, and the effect is a lack of awareness for the need of a broader security 
strategy until a security incident occurs (ISACA 2009). As Anderson (2008) states, “Security en-
gineering requires cross-disciplinary expertise, ranging from cryptography and computer security 
through hardware tamper-resistance and formal methods to a knowledge of economics, applied 
psychology, organizations and the law.” The solutions are not just technical and require a broad-
er response. 
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Organisational Security Principles and Standards 
Security standards are used as a benchmark by organisations to provide a level of assurance for 
their security programs. As Siponen and Wilson (2009) state, “By adopting an authoritative 
guideline, organizations can demonstrate their commitment to secure business practices; organi-
sations may then apply for certification, accreditation, or a security-maturity classification attest-
ing to their compliance to a set of rules and practices.” The choice of the standard or standards 
is based on the requirements of the organisation’s security needs. Following is a discussion of the 
most commonly identified standards, summarised in Table 4. 
International Information Systems Security Certification Consortium — Common Body of 
Knowledge ([ISC]2 CBK) (Contesti et al. 2007) 
ISC2 is an internationally recognised organisation that holds a continually developing body of 
knowledge for information security. The CBK serves as a common framework of terms and 
principles, which are used to define global industry information security standards (Theoharidou 
and Gritzalis 2007).   
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) (NIST 2013) 
NIST is the federal technology agency for the United States that “works with industry to develop 
and apply technology, measurements, and standards” through research and development of cur-
rent and emerging technologies (NIST 2013). The information technology branch specialises in 
areas such as:  
 Biometrics 
 Computer Forensics 
 Computer Security 
 Conformance Testing 
 Cybersecurity 
 Data Mining 
 Data and Informatics 
 Health IT 
 Imaging 
 Information Delivery Systems 
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 Networking 
 Scientific Computing 
 Software Testing Metrics 
 Telecommunications/Wireless 
NIST has two frameworks for adoption in security. The first is the NIST Cyber Security Frame-
work (NIST CSF) which is a framework that can be used but any organisation to develop a secu-
rity program. The second is the NIST 800-53 which is specifically developed to keep the U.S. 
Federal Government secure and is more than 10 times longer than the NIST CSF, demonstrat-
ing its complexity and prescriptiveness.  
International Organisation for Standardization / International Electro-technical Commission  
(ISO/IEC) 27000 and 17799 (ISO 2013) 
The ISO provides “specifications for products, services and systems, to ensure quality, safety and 
efficiency” specifically for the benefit of international trade (ISO 2013). The development of a 
standard is done through a consensus of international industry experts on the particular subject 
as requested or required. ISO 27000 is the family of standards (includes 27001, 27002, 27003, 
27004) for an information security management system and ISO 17799 is the code of practice 
for information security management (ISO 2013).  
Control Objectives for Information and Related Technology (COBIT) Security (De Haes et al. 
2013) 
COBIT is a management and governance framework for information technology created by the 
Information Systems Audit and Control Association (ISACA). Initially COBIT was created by 
auditors for their use in organisations but the framework, now in its 5th iteration, is used more 
broadly as a practical solution to guide and implement governance principles (De Haes et al. 
2013). The framework has identified 316 objectives for an organisation to achieve in order to be 
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in compliance with COBIT, however, only 21 are directly security related indicating that security 
is not the focus of this framework (von Solms 2005). 
Information Technology Infrastructure Library (ITIL) Security (Clinch 2009) 
ITIL provides guidance on how to use information technology as a tool to “facilitate business 
change, transformation and growth”(ITIL 2015). Similar to COBIT Security, ITIL has security as 
a part of its framework however, it is not the focus. Of note is that the information security 
management content in ITIL is directly mapped to the ISO/IEC 27001 and 27002 standards and 
therefore a more accurate reference would be ISO/IEC (Clinch 2009; ISO 2013). 
Author Title Geographical 
Remit 
Purpose and Features 





— Common Body of 
Knowledge ([ISC]2 CBK) 
International Common framework of terms and 
principles that defines global security 
standards. 
(NIST 2013) National Institute of 





Provides recommended security con-
trols in federal information systems and 
for organisations and industry that 
work with federal agencies. 
(ISO 2013) International Organisation 
for Standardization / 
International Electro-
technical Commission  
(ISO/IEC) 27000 and 
17799 
International International standards that ensure 
quality, safety and efficiency. Used par-
ticularly in international transactions or 
trade. 
(De Haes et al. 
2013) 
Control Objectives for 
Information and Related 
Technology (COBIT) Se-
curity 
International Created by Information Systems Audit 
and Control Association (ISACA) as a 
set of governance principles and pro-
cesses for the management of infor-
mation technology. 






Codifies best practices in information 
technology gathered from many 
sources including industry. 
Table 4:   Commonly Referenced Security Standards 
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2.3 Enterprise Security Architecture 
The earliest enterprise security architecture (ESA) frameworks were developed in 1995 
(Sherwood et al. 1995) and the few approaches available all agree that “the problem is that no 
standardised, comprehensive information security architecture currently exists” (Copeland 2017; 
Eloff and Eloff 2005). Our analysis of existing work identified five surveys of ESA frameworks 
(Table 5), which give a broad domain overview of the status of Enterprise Security Architecture 
as a discipline. The surveys are discussed below.  
Year Author Notable Features and Focus 
2011 Shariati, Bahmani & Shams The interoperability of organisational archi-
tectures and the direct conflict with security 
principles 
2009 Oda, Fu & Zhu The effectiveness of ESA frameworks on 
certain criteria including business architec-
ture, information architecture and technology 
architecture 
2007 Da Veiga & Eloff Information security governance frameworks 
2006 Claycomb & Shin Enterprise security management architectures 
for mobile devices – particularly criteria au-
thentication, access control and audit 
2005 Eloff and Eloff ESA frameworks from various fields includ-
ing risk management and international stand-
ards. 
Table 5:   Existing ESA Surveys Reviewed 
Existing Surveys of Enterprise Security Architecture Frameworks  
The Shariati, Bahmani and Shams (Shariati et al. 2011) survey of five frameworks focuses on the 
importance of interoperability for organisational architectures, perceiving an organisation as a 
holistic seamless flow of information rather than compartments, which is a key requirement of 
enterprise architecture. The issue raised is that interoperability is in a direct conflict with the 
principles of security. Such security principles as “need to know”, physical defence of assets and 
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confidentiality confirm the struggle. The paper’s goal is to identify holistic security frameworks 
that support interoperability. The review provides a description of interoperability aspects and its 
importance in frameworks, specifically in the areas of technical, organisational and semantic. 
This inclusion helps the reader better understand the focus of the research. Furthermore, the 
holistic versus partial section provides a convincing discussion about the utility of holistic 
frameworks rather than partial frameworks which tend to have a limited domain specific use. 
The paper does not include a recommendation for a suggested framework that would incorpo-
rate interoperability. The Oda et al. review (Oda et al. 2009) aims to determine the effectiveness 
of ESA frameworks based on a number of criteria including business architecture, information 
architecture, technology architecture, security architecture, levels of abstraction and case studies. 
The review/survey looks at three frameworks, including the Zachman framework (Zachman 
2011), which does not have a security element but is stated as  being the foundation of all enter-
prise information architecture frameworks, and is included on that basis. The purpose is to de-
termine the effectiveness of the architectures. The paper concludes with a case study of the en-
terprise information security architecture at the Oakland University in the U.S. The three archi-
tectures are explained and analysed in detail. However, the survey only considers two security 
architectures. Moreover, the Oakland University case study does not consider the introduced 
criteria.  
The Da Veiga and Eloff work (Veiga and Eloff 2007) is centred on governance and, while not 
titled a review paper, does have a comprehensive “existing approaches” section and reviews four 
information security governance frameworks. The purpose of the paper is to derive a list of 
components (a principle or a security control or both) for the development of a new security 
governance framework. The review derives six components (leadership and governance; security 
management and organisation; security policies; security program management; user security 
management; technology protection and operations) placed into three categories: strategic, man-
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agerial or operational, and technical. It is not clear from the research why the particular frame-
works were chosen because no selection criteria are given.  
The 2006 Claycomb and Shin (Claycomb and Shin 2006) research is focused on enterprise secu-
rity management architectures for mobile devices that use all of the aspects of organisational ar-
chitectures. It reviews two related works using the criteria authentication, access control and au-
dit. The review provides a detailed description of the suggested new security architecture includ-
ing diagram specifications and a proof of concept implementation. Although the paper uses the 
phrase ‘enterprise architecture’, no reference to enterprise architecture principles is present and 
there are only two frameworks surveyed, which limits the analysis. The choice of criteria also in-
dicates a technical focus, which would not provide a holistic security view of the organisation. In 
contrast, the chosen criteria in this research provides a complete view of an organisation choos-
ing EA specifically because of the holistic aspect.  
The Eloff and Eloff survey (Eloff and Eloff 2005) reviews five existing ESA frameworks from 
various fields including risk management and international standards. The survey then draws 
from the analysis to develop five principles for an ESA framework. The five principles are based 
on procedures, technology, and people, and are namely: holistic, security control synchroniza-
tion, risk management, life-cycle implementation, and measures. The inherent challenge with this 
list of principles is its broadness, in that the scope of the principles is not defined and therefore it 
might be difficult to develop a comprehensive security architecture that meets all principles. The 
proposed principles in this work focus on security and enterprise architecture. 
SUMMARY 
This review of related work indicates a need for a new ESA frameworks survey as the most re-
cent survey was in 2010 (Shariati et al. 2011) and the largest surveys have five frameworks (Eloff 
and Eloff 2005; Shariati et al. 2011). Given the changes in the security environment, the devel-
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opment of new works, the previous coverage and the time lapse, the conclusion is a comprehen-
sive, criteria-based survey of ESAs was required and is beneficial for the domain. 
2.4 Enterprise Security Architecture Review 
This section presents a semi-systematic literature review, conducted as a part of this research, 
within organisational security structures and the research used the learning to establish principles 
for the foundation of the ESA design.  
Google Scholar and the ACM Digital Library database were searched and citations were followed 
for articles about enterprise security architecture. Google search terms included those associated 
with ‘enterprise (‘organisation’, ‘management’, ‘information’, ‘business’, ‘information systems’, 
‘information technology’) AND security AND architecture (‘information landscape’, ‘structure’, 
‘process’, ‘governance’)’ AND framework (‘model’, ‘plan’)’.  
Inclusion Exclusion 
Security focus No security 
Business intent No framework 
Architectural focus Prior to 1995 
Research papers and reports or white papers Theoretical papers 
1995 - 2020  
Table 6:   Inclusion/exclusion criteria 
Relevant works matching the inclusion/exclusion criteria (Table 6) were entered into EndNote 
X7.3.1 with the PDF as an attachment. The results were used for classification and analysis. 
The inclusion and exclusion criteria were determined based on the simplest version of an ESA 
framework. An ESA should have security, architecture and business as its focus. If the work was 
not a framework or security was not the focus, it was excluded. This was done to provide the 
broadest definition and therefore capture all relevant ESA frameworks developed during the last 
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26 years. EA frameworks that focused on the organisation but had not included security were 
excluded, such as Abdullah and Galal-Edeen (2006), Covington and Jahangir(2009), Lange et al. 
(2012) and Mykhashchuk (2011). Similarly security-based principles papers that did not include a 
recommended framework were excluded, such as Anderson and Choobineh (2008), Hone and 
Eloff (2002), Ohki et al. (2009) and Siponen and Willison (2009).  
Table 7 is the list of the 27 frameworks that directly matched the criteria and intent. These 
frameworks were further reviewed and analysed and the following discussion looks at the key 
aspects that were identified during this analysis; EA principles, technology and people, security 
standards, ontologies and Zachman based ESA. The importance of the consistencies and differ-
ences are observed and explained.   
Year Author Framework name Notable features 
(1995) Sherwood, 
Clark, Lynas 
Sherwood Applied Business 
Security Architecture 
Project based implementation  
(2000) Sandhu The Objective and Model - 
Architecture Mechanism 
Framework  
Based on a Network Protocol Stack with a 
many to many relationship between layers 
(2002) Ho Security Management 
Framework 
Information security professional require-
ments, Zachman based framework – 6 Col-
umns (Data, Function, Network, People, 
Time, Motivation) 
(2003) Trcek Information Systems Securi-
ty Management Framework 
9 Planes (Technology, Organisation, Legisla-
tion, Human Interactions, Human-Machine 
Interactions, Crypto Protocols, Crypto Primi-




Policy Framework for 
 Interpreting Risk in  
E-Business Security 
4 Phases (Assess, Plan, Deliver, Operate) 
(2004) Posthumus, 
Von Solms 
Information Security  
Governance Framework 
4 Aspects (Legal, Business, Infrastructure, 
Standards) 
(2005) Ertaul,  
Sudarsanam 
Enterprise Security Plan Column 6 of Zachman (Why) replaced with 
"External Requirements and Constraints" 
(2005) Eloff, Eloff Information Security  
Architecture 
5 Requirements (Holistic, Controls, Compre-
hensive, Life-cycle, Measurable) 
(2006) Killmeyer Information Security  
Architecture 
A “How-To” book for implementing an In-
formation Security Architecture 
(2006) Scholtz Gartner Enterprise Infor-
mation Security Architecture 
3 Layered Pyramid (Conceptual, Logical,  
Implementation) 
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Roadmap for Information 
Security Across the  
Enterprise 
3 Tiers (Profile, Plan, Protect) 
(2008) Sun, Chen Intelligent Enterprise  
Information Security  
Architecture 
Based on the 7 layers of the Open Systems 




Service Orientated  
Architecture Security  
Governance Model 
4 Layers (Strategic, Tactical, Operational,  
Real-Time) 
(2009) Shen, Lin, 
Rohm 
Enterprise Security  
Architecture Framework 
3 Noted dimensions - Framework, Policy and 
Technical 
(2010) NIST, OMB, 
FCIO 
US Federal Enterprise  
Architecture Security and 
Privacy Policy  




Information Security Risk 
Management Framework 
5 Domains (Strategy, Technology,  
Organization, People, Environment) 
(2011) TOGAF Open Enterprise Security 
Architecture 
4 Dimensions (Program Management, Gov-
ernance, Enterprise Architecture, Operations) 
(2013) ISO/IEC 
27000 
International Standard for 
Information Technology - 
Security  
14 Security Control Clauses (Policy, Organi-
sation, Human Resources, Asset Manage-
ment, Access Control, Cryptography, Physical 
and Environmental, Operations, Communi-
cations, System Acquisition Development 
and Maintenance, Supplier Relationships, 




Holistic Cyber Security  
Implementation Framework 
A framework / strategy to determine current 
security level and gap analysis for new  
security level 




Situation Aware -  
Information Security Risk 
Management Model  
Collection, analysis and reporting of  
organisational risk information to improve 
information security risk assessment 
(2015) Luhach & 
Luhach 
Logical Security Framework Framework based on Service Orientated  




Cyber Physical Systems  
Security Framework 
Cyber physical system security framework 
using systems engineering principles 
(2016) Jeganathan Enterprise Security  
Architecture Framework 
An enterprise security architecture framework 




Information Security  
Management Assessment 
Framework 
Design Science Research to create a security 
critical infrastructure framework -  
4 dimensions - security ambition, security 




Cloud migration framework A secure cloud computing framework using 
meta-synthesis - uses 7 stage maturity model 
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(2018) Berkel, Singh, 
van Sinderen 
Smart Cities Information 
Security Architecture 
A target enterprise architecture using a  
meta-model for security to include system 
developers, ICT experts, administrators, 







Architecture Management – 
Information Systems  
Security Risk Management)  
Assets, risk and risk treatment model 
Table 7:  Existing Security Frameworks Reviewed 
Enterprise Architecture Principles 
Among the reviewed frameworks, the Zachman EA framework is the most directly referenced. 
Sherwood et al. (1995), Ho (2002), Ertaul et al. (2005) and Mayer et al. (2019) all discuss the sig-
nificant influence the Zachman EA has had on the development of their security frameworks. As 
an example, the matrices developed by the three works all include at least five of the six English 
interrogatives of the Zachman framework (what, how, where, who, when, why) and two of the 
three use all of the interrogatives. Moreover, the audience perspectives identified by Zachman 
(executive, business management, architect, engineer, technician, enterprise) are also used by all 
three authors. These three papers agree there is a missing security element to the Zachman and 
are attempting to remedy the issue with their research. One other paper also references the 
Zachman framework. Shen et al. (2009), states their framework is a security dimension of the 
Zachman framework. However, the Zachman principles, theory and structure are not evident in 
the developed framework. 
General EA principles are referenced in four other frameworks, Scholtz (2006), Anderson et al. 
(2008), Jeganathan (2016) and the U.S. Federal Enterprise Architecture Security and Privacy Pol-
icy (FEA-SPP) (NIST 2010). Scholtz (2006), Jeganathan (2016) and Anderson et al. (2008) use 
EA principles such as translating business requirements into operational solutions; linking organ-
isational vision to enterprise processes, policies and technology; creating a holistic integration of 
business process management and technical infrastructure; the use of terms such as “viewpoint” 
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instead of perspective,  (Zachman inference), “as-is” and “to-be” (the traditional method of EA); 
the concept of an ESA should be woven into the organisation’s EA not a stand-alone function; 
the identification of artifacts in the ESA; and ESA is a top-down approach as is EA. The FEA-
SPP (NIST 2010), which is for a federal U.S. agency, is fully integrated into the Federal Enter-
prise Architecture (FEA) and uses all the principles from this extensive, government specific, EA 
methodology. 
The Federal Enterprise Architecture Framework (FEAF) (U.S.Government 2013) (see Figure 3) 
for the United States (U.S.) Government was created as a common framework for the federal 
agencies to use and therefore improve interoperability and communication (Sessions 2007). The 
framework is comprehensive and very large in its implementation, as expected given the U.S. 
Government is one of the most complex organisations in the world. It is based on five perfor-
mance reference models: business, service, components, technical, and data. The FEAF is an 
effective EA however, the challenge is the use of it outside the U.S. federal public sector. It is so 
large in scale that its application in a private organisation would be incredibly difficult. There was 
only one reference to the FEAF in our survey which was the security section of the FEAF 
(NIST 2010).   
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Figure 3:  The Federal Enterprise Architecture Framework (U.S.Government 2013) 
Technology, People, Process and Information 
The assets of an organisation are technology, people, process and information. Most organisa-
tions’ security is based on technology and policy, both of which are easier to create or buy and 
implement than security for people, information or process, which is more time consuming and 
expensive (Roberti 2001). It is still very common for a company to believe that organisational 
security is solely about virus defence and firewalls (ISACA 2009); both of which are resolved 
with policy and technology. Most do not include broader organisational security mechanisms in 
their definitions of security, other than computer security technology and the policies surround-
ing the technology. The effect is a lack of an organisational security strategy or architecture 
(ISACA 2009; Juntunen and Virta 2019). Securing these assets is therefore critical and the focus 
of the assets in the security frameworks reviewed is discussed below. 
An example of a framework with a purpose that satisfies the criteria: technology, process and 
people, is the Eloff and Eloff (Eloff and Eloff 2005) framework.  Any computer asset that is 
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used in the running of the day to day business is defined by the authors as technical and includes 
software, products, application systems, hardware and networks. The framework has developed 
its own process model which is a continuous feedback life-cycle approach for ESA. People secu-
rity incorporates security into the organisational culture, training and awareness programs which 
may include legal and ethical aspects. The framework effectively takes all aspects of an organisa-
tion’s assets into consideration and demonstrates an all-encompassing purpose.  
The focus of both Sandhu (2000) and Sun et al. (2008) is a technical security architecture for the 
organisation. As an example, Sandhu has created an architecture and has trialled it in a distribut-
ed role-based access control application. However, the goal of the architecture is broader and 
included in the research are organisational perspectives, architectural layers, artifacts, identifying 
objectives and creating architecture and mechanisms to implement the objectives organisational-
ly. Similarly, Sun et al. have focused on a security aspect of Service Orientated Architecture 
(SOA) for the technical aspects of an organisation. Both papers are using the Open Systems In-
terconnection (OSI) reference model to structure their technical architectures. SOA is also the 
focus of the Korhonen et al. (2009) research but the authors chose a governance view rather 
than a technical one. 
There are three research papers included in this review that provide a security architecture for 
technology supporting E-Business, two of these were published in 2003, just as E-Commerce 
began to exponentially grow.  They are Trcek (2003) and Rees et al. (2003). Both emphasize the 
security challenges of the Internet marketplace, the legal issues involved, the policies which need 
to be developed, technical recommendations, and the management of an E-Business product 
lifecycle. A later paper from Luhach and Luhach (2015) provides a technical solution to E-
Business with a logical security framework using service orientated architecture and validated on 
Oscommerce (https://www.oscommerce.com/). 
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Only four frameworks discuss people in their security architectures. Sherwood et al. (1995) has 
placed a lot of emphasis on the human aspect of their framework including expertise, education, 
training, experience, appraisals, trustworthy, security vetting etc. Eloff and Eloff (2005) have 
considered the human–machine interaction, human relationships, security culture and awareness 
of staff, training, ethics and legal issues for security professionals. Saleh and Alfantookh (2011) 
discuss the importance of human expertise, employee morale, loyalty, ethics, training and human 
resource security. Finally the International Standard ISO/IEC 27000 (ISO 2013) dedicates a 
chapter to human resource security including screening, qualifications, trust, promotion, job 
specifications etc. ISACA (2009) states that if the human factors of an organisation, such as cul-
ture, governance and training are not taken care of, the architecture and the security of the or-
ganisation will always be at risk. 
Security Standards 
Security standards are used as a benchmark by organisations to provide a level of assurance for 
their security programs (Siponen and Willison 2009). The standards identified after analysis of 
the 27 frameworks were NIST 800-39, 800-53 and 800-55 (6 frameworks), ISO/IEC 27002 (10 
frameworks), ITIL (2 frameworks), CIA (4 frameworks), COBIT (De Haes et al. 2013) (2 
frameworks), Standard of Good Practice for Information Security (2014) (1 framework) and 6 
Sigma (Linderman et al. 2003) (1 framework). Eight of the 27 papers used no security standard in 
the development of their framework. 
Traditionally confidentiality, integrity and availability (CIA) are the foundational security objec-
tives for all organisations (Stoneburner 2001), and for completeness accountability and assurance 
are usually included with the triad. Two papers have chosen, for compliance and assurance pur-
poses, the CIA principles rather than a more prescriptive industry standard such as NIST 800-53 
or ISO/IEC 27002. Posthumus et al. (2004) present a governance security framework which is 
strategic in nature, usually providing overarching guidance to an organisation. Choosing a more 
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detailed security standard would be very difficult to implement for a governance structure, there-
fore the choice is logical. Killmeyer (2006) has developed an organisational security program, 
commercially available, which is based on CIA. Due to the commercial nature of the program, 
perhaps the restrictive requirements of a security standard like NIST 800-53 or ISO/IEC 27002 
could have limited the scope of work. 
12 out of 27 frameworks state explicitly that they are in compliance with at least one industry 
standard. Four frameworks state they are in compliance with two standards. One claimed com-
pliance with three standards. The most common standard referenced is ISO/IEC 27002 (58% of 
those claiming standard compliance), and the second most common is NIST 800-53 (25% of 
those claiming standard compliance), which is expected given both are from highly respected 
organisations in the security industry. ISO/IEC 27002 is the only standard that can also be con-
sidered a framework due to its extensive subject matter and it is used as a standard reference and 
also as a framework to be analysed. 
The Open Enterprise Security Architecture (Wahe 2011) framework, which is a part of the TO-
GAF (Haren 2011), a large and well respected enterprise architecture, emphasises the importance 
of using industry standards in the development of the framework. The two standards adopted 
throughout this framework are NIST 800-53 (NIST 2013) and ISO/IEC 27002 (ISO 2013), and 
the paper recognises both as well-established and adopted worldwide in the security industry. 
The use of these standards provides a security assurance to the framework while offering holistic 
security knowledge for completeness of the framework. 
Ontologies 
The utility of a framework being an ontology is that an ontology is made up of primitive models 
or objects, which can be used by an organisation to create an architecture — this is how the 
Zachman is implemented. These primitive models are the classification name of a required cell in 
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the framework. A descriptive representation of the primitive model is an artifact which is the 
example of the classification. To clarify with a security example: a primitive model might be ac-
cess control. A security requirement of an enterprise is the access control. An artifact of access 
control might be a security guard. The security guard is the descriptive representation of access 
control. Primitive models are used because they are proscriptive not prescriptive in nature. In the 
example, the organisation knows it must have access control (the primitive model), but it is free 
to determine what the implementation (or artifact) is based on budget, company size, staffing 
number etc. As a part of the analysis on the identified frameworks, it was determined if they are 
using any primitive models, therefore creating an ontology, or if their framework was artifact 
based — requiring specific security instances.  
The results indicated that there are no security frameworks that are completely ontology based. 
Just over 40% of the frameworks are partial ontologies in that they used some primitive security 
models in their work. It is likely that the use of the primitive models was based on common se-
curity industry jargon rather than the intentional creation of an ontology as there is no mention 
of primitive models in the supporting research. Artifact-based frameworks make up 59% of ana-
lysed frameworks, which for the purposes of security compliance; require the users to demon-
strate specific artifacts. 
The Sherwood et al. (Sherwood et al. 1995) framework is a mixed framework type that demon-
strates the challenge of creating an ontology- or artifact-based framework. It is one of the 
frameworks that show indicators of an ontology. This framework uses both artifact and ontolog-
ical terminology in the description of the requirements for compliance to the framework. Exam-
ples of artifacts terms used are data dictionary, network, validation and testing. Examples of on-
tology terms used are access control, risk management and trust models. The challenge of devel-
oping an ontology framework will be the careful choice of security classifications rather than de-
tailed security instances. 
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Zachman Based Enterprise Security Frameworks Discussion 
The concept of using the Zachman Enterprise Architecture framework for the purposes of secu-
rity is not a new one, however, it has not yet been fully explored. The following discussions de-
scribe the three frameworks, Sherwood (1995), Ertaul and Sudarsanam (2005) and Ho (2002) 
based on the Zachman. The conclusion from the three papers is that the Zachman framework is 
a well-defined structure to create an Enterprise Security Architecture framework, however, none 
of the proposed frameworks adheres wholly to its strict principles. An adherence to the princi-
ples would create a security ontology for enterprise architecture. Table 8 provides a side by side 
overview of the key points.  
Enterprise Security Plan (Ertaul and Sudarsanam 2005) 
This paper uses the second version of the Zachman framework as a starting point to create a 
“strategic framework for security planning” for government. The plan hopes to address the need 
for a logical way to view security within an organisation, to organise the complexities that address 
risk and thus to provide a more secure organisation given the increase in government security 
attacks. 
The similarities to the Zachman include the headings for columns 1 through 5, rows 1 through 4 
and row 6. The authors state that they use both the framework and the principles John Zachman 
identified for his framework.  
The paper departs from the Zachman with the replacement of Column 6 (the Why interrogative) 
with a new column — External Requirements and Constraints. A second replacement is the Row 
5 heading, which has gone from Implementers to Sub-Contractors. There is no explanation in 
the paper for any of these changes. The authors have acknowledged the need for each cell to be 
unique, however, there are many duplicates in the plan they have created. Finally, the Zachman 
Michelle Graham - Enterprise Security Architecture – Mythology or Methodology 
Dissertation for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy – School of Computer Science, University of Adelaide 
Page 38 
framework is an ontology however, this framework is a mix of ontological phrases and security 
instances.  
Security Management Framework (Ho 2002) 
The security management framework developed by Ho uses the same framework as the Zach-
man. The author’s choice of the Zachman was because “companies must take a total enterprise 
approach, integrating the security of a myriad of IT activities… into a holistic corporate security 
solution”. The security framework uses the same row and column headings as Version 2 of the 
Zachman.  
There are two departures from Zachman. The first is the Zachman principle of row combination 
— the combination of all the cells in any single row forms a complete view description for that 
perspective e.g. a Planner, Owner or Designer perspective. The discussion provided by Ho ex-
plains each column as a whole picture – based on the interrogatives, but the horizontal views are 
not taken into consideration.  Secondly, there is a mix of classifications versus instances. Similar 
to the Ertaul & Sudarsanum framework, the product is actually a security instance of the Zach-
man framework, not a security ontology. 
SABSA (Sherwood et al. 1995) 
The Sherwood Applied Business Security Architecture (SABSA) is a commercial methodology 
for enterprise security architecture. The approach aims to provide all business security needs of 
customers and compliment any existing EA framework. The SABSA framework documentation 
states that it is underpinned by risk management, assurance, governance, a maturity profile and 
ongoing auditing. SABSA is essentially based on the Zachman framework. The layer names are 
the same, the column headings are also the same but have been re-ordered, however, the views 
have been re-ordered and renamed. The 6 x 6 matrix has been completed using business and se-
curity terminology.  
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The initial iteration of the SABSA framework was aimed at technical projects only and the com-
pany then decided to include corporate views to extend its usability for customers. The result is 
documentation that discusses security architecture holistically however, the framework artifacts 
themselves are technical e.g. there is no mention of non-technical security measures such as 
physical, human security or corporate security strategy. The methodology states it is providing an 
information security solution as compared to a broader security solution. The SABSA process 
would support an information technology project and its processes are described for projects not 
an organisation.  
Another important change from the Zachman framework and from EA is the recommendations 
by SABSA for customers to select the pieces of their framework they feel are useful and disre-
gard the rest. The Zachman framework is a complete enterprise ontology and is used as a whole, 
not as a piecemeal approach, so the SABSA approach contradicts this philosophy. A foundation-
al tenet of EA is the collation of all organisational views for the purpose of getting a whole-of-
organisation “as-is” capture — where the enterprise is now. The organisation then takes a com-
plete view and makes decisions on where they would like “to-be” and an action plan is put into 
place to achieve this. By selecting only parts of the organisation, the purpose of EA is defeated.  
Whilst these departures from the Zachman and EA do not impact the commercial purpose of 
the SABSA, they do not allow organisations that use the Zachman to directly use the SABSA for 
their security because the alignment is not there. 
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Table 8:  Comparison of existing Zachman based frameworks 
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2.5 Guiding Recommendations  
The analysis of the 27 frameworks identified in our review provides an indication of important 
recommendations that help guide an organisation to a more secure corporate posture and con-
currently support the achievement of corporate vision and strategy. Among the 27 frameworks, 
the only methodology utilised more than once is EA, which has been referenced in seven frame-
works. It is the most common and effective methodology implemented to achieve a holistic secu-
rity strategy.   
The following discussion explains the five principles (summarised in Table 9) from the analysis 
work of the frameworks review, which have guided the development of the enterprise security 
architecture artifact. 
 
Principle 1 The framework must provide security mechanisms for all organisa-
tional assets 
 
Principle 2 The framework must be an ontology 
 
Principle 3 The framework must be in compliance with at least one international 
security industry standard 
 
Principle 4 The framework must use an enterprise architecture reference 
 
Principle 5 The framework must cover the organisation holistically 
Table 9:   Principles of Enterprise Security Architecture 
Framework Purpose (Principle 1) 
The purpose of an effective framework should be to support the organisation’s vision. To do 
this, all assets of a company should be employed e.g., people, technology, process and infor-
mation. The recommendation derived from this criterion is therefore a holistic framework will 
include security mechanisms for all of the assets. Providing a separate security strategy for each 
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department or asset; or choosing a select few assets to secure would not provide full security 
coverage and therefore lacks defence in depth. For example the Sun and Chen (2008) framework 
focused on securing technology only and the Shen et al. (2009) framework focused on security 
policy only. 
Framework Type (Principle 2) 
EA ontologies are classification systems that provide a structured way to articulate the required 
organisational assets for the purpose of alignment to the corporate vision, whilst allowing the 
company to choose the implementation based on its specific needs. In contrast, artifact-based 
framework types require a company to purchase or produce specific artifacts or methodologies to 
be in compliance. Artifact-based frameworks are restrictive and difficult to comply with particu-
larly if the company is small and has budget constraints and do not take into account the nuances 
and individuality of each company. The principle from this criterion is to provide the organisa-
tion a framework type that is secure but also works with the individual organisational needs – an 
ontology. 
Security Compliance / Assurance (Principle 3) 
The concept of security is not new and there are very effective security standards available. Secu-
rity standards are used as a benchmark by organisations to provide a level of assurance for their 
security programs (Siponen and Willison 2009). For compliance and assurance purposes, a 
framework should be in compliance with at least one security standard. From the framework re-
views, two standards are used more than any others and either or both would provide an effec-
tive compliance tool. The two recommendations are ISO/IEC 27002 and NIST 800-53. The rec-
ommendation from this criterion is the use of an internationally recognized standard to provide 
security assurance. 
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Enterprise Architecture Reference (Principle 4) 
EA is a proven structure for organisations to use to effectively complete their mission (Bittler 
and Kreizman 2005). From the analysis of the 27 frameworks, seven of the 27 reference EA in 
some form, with two frameworks specifically named – the Zachman and the FEAF. Moreover 
some of the most implemented EA structures have used the Zachman as a basis for the devel-
opment of significant frameworks. These are the TOGAF (Josey 2009), the GEAF (Bittler and 
Kreizman 2005), the FEAF (U.S.Government 2013) and the DoDAF (DoD 2010).  The recom-
mendation from this criterion is therefore the use of an existing and well referenced EA for the 
basis of the development of a framework. 
Framework Coverage (Principle 5) 
The need for security initially began with the protection of information stored on computers 
however, this has broadened to include all departments within an organisation. The difficulty is 
that most departments have retained the individual control of the security measures they have put 
in place and this has meant that each security solution is managed separately (see Table 1). The 
overall effect is a lack of a cohesive strategy for organisational security (Eloff and Eloff 2005). To 
provide effective security for any entity, the whole entity needs to be considered. The same is true 
of an organisation. If we choose to only secure a department, the rest of the organisation remains 
insecure. The recommendation from the criterion is for a framework to regard the whole of the 
organisation, not just singular departments or assets. A structure that provides an integrated view 
of all security instances will give a credibility and confidence to business security responsibility 
(ISO 2013). 
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Principles Based Framework Development 
This work addresses an important and critical issue through the development and objective re-
view of an ESA that relies on thoroughly researched principles. The recommendations discussed 
form the guiding principles of an organisation-wide ESA ontology and provide a research foun-
dation for a newly developed ESA framework, which this dissertation will detail. The analysis has 
shown that the majority of the 27 frameworks satisfy a subset of the principles. Specifically, secu-
rity mechanisms for all organisational assets (Principle 1) is satisfied by six frameworks (Eloff and 
Eloff 2005; ISO 2013; Killmeyer 2006; Saleh and Alfantookh 2011; Scholtz 2006; Sherwood et al. 
1995). The framework should be an ontology (Principle 2) was partially fulfilled by seven frame-
works (Eloff and Eloff 2005; Ertaul and Sudarsanam 2005; Ho 2002; ISO 2013; Scholtz 2006; 
Sherwood et al. 1995; Wahe 2011) and although were not ontologies, did have some reference to 
ontological security terminology. Nine frameworks satisfied compliance to international security 
standards (Principle 3) (Anderson and Rachamadugu 2008; Eloff and Eloff 2005; Korhonen et al. 
2009; NIST 2010; Saleh and Alfantookh 2011; Shen et al. 2009; Sun and Chen 2008; Trcek 2003; 
Wahe 2011). Use of an enterprise architecture reference (Principle 4) was indicated by seven 
frameworks (Anderson and Rachamadugu 2008; Ertaul and Sudarsanam 2005; Ho 2002; NIST 
2010; Scholtz 2006; Shen et al. 2009; Sherwood et al. 1995). A holistic framework (Principle 5) 
was demonstrated by 11 frameworks (Anderson and Rachamadugu 2008; Eloff and Eloff 2005; 
Ho 2002; ISO 2013; Killmeyer 2006; Korhonen et al. 2009; Posthumus and Von Solms 2004; 
Scholtz 2006; Shen et al. 2009; Sherwood et al. 1995; Wahe 2011).  
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Figure 4 shows how the principles effect and interact with each other and the organisation. For 
example, the organisational vision directs and uses the assets of the organisation (people, infor-
mation, technology and process) in all departments, whilst being secured and enabled through the 
ESA. This is done with the use of a security framework that is defined by enterprise architecture 
primitives. The primitives are defined first to ensure compliance with security standards and are 
then compared to the organisation to determine what the current situation of the organisation is 
and what can be improved to strengthen security. 
 
 
Figure 4:   Enterprise Security Architecture Role in an Organisation 
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2.6 Summary 
In summary, this chapter presents a background of the domains of enterprise architecture, se-
curity and enterprise security architecture. A semi-systematic review was conducted of security 
frameworks and it is evident that the grouping of security with EA, through a framework with 
corresponding security classifications and representations, promises a complete security solution. 
27 security frameworks are evaluated and this work finds that grouping security with EA is not 
new, however, current solutions indicate a lack of research process in development and a disjoint 
focus in either technical, policy / department, or project. Thus, there is a need for a holistic solu-
tion. Through the review, several principles for the development of organisational security mod-
els are extracted and the most referenced five principles are identified. The five principles provide 
a foundation to develop the ESA framework and evaluate the design, which is addressing the 
problem statement “will a holistic security model using EA provide security benefits to an organ-
isation more effectively than a piecemeal approach”. 
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This research addresses the problem statement “will a holistic security model using Enterprise 
Architecture (EA) provide security benefits to an organisation more effectively than a piecemeal 
approach”. It does this by evaluating a design founded on the five design principles developed 
through the semi-systematic literature review described in the previous chapter. The foundation 
of this research is based on philosophies and methods chosen for their best application to the 
research and cohesively to each other. This chapter describes these methods, including the ra-
tionale for their selection. The careful selection is important because it provides rigour around 
the structure of the research.  
The philosophy for this work is constructivist, the approach is inductive and the choice of data 
analysis is qualitative, using the grounded theory methodology to analyse an Oppenheim 
(Oppenheim 2000) qualitative questionnaire. The overarching design methodology is Design Sci-
ence Research (DSR) (Hevner et al. 2004).  
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The philosophy of the development of research is based on a system of beliefs and assump-
tions that are used in all research stages. The shaping belief system can be drawn from the re-
search field, e.g., information systems, surrounding realities or the human aspects of the research-
er themselves and how they interpret the world and the findings (Burrell and Morgan 1979; 
Crotty 1998). This research is based in the underlying assumptions of constructivism, which are 
often used in concert with DSR and with qualitative research. This provides a basis for how 
knowledge is perceived and how it can be obtained (Hirschheim 1985) throughout the DSR ac-
tivity. Constructivism describes truths not as discovered, but as reliant on human awareness and 
the struggle of the conflict between personal models and discrepant new insights that create new 
representations of reality. The new models, using cultural tools and symbols, bring meaning and 
find authentication through discussion in communities of practice (Fosnot 2013). DSR and our 
research is representative of this world-view due to the nature of the conception of a problem 
statement idea (the current world-view model is challenged), development of a design to address 
the challenge (incorporating the conflict between what we knew and what we now know), the 
artifact to test the design and the cyclical analysis of the artifact until the design is satisfied (new 
knowledge and models are created) (Mills et al. 2006; Strauss and Corbin 1998). 
Other Philosophies 
Through the process of determining the most suitable philosophy for this research, others were 
considered, including positivism, idealism and interpretivism. Positivism recognises only things 
that can be scientifically verified, usually using logical or mathematical proofs – quantitative con-
structs, and is sometimes referred to as the scientific method (Pather and Remenyi 2005). Due to 
the qualitative nature of this research, and the philosophy’s rejection of metaphysics and theism, 
positivism was not chosen. Idealism believes that thoughts and ideas make up reality and that it is 
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not possible to be sure that anything in the outside world exists (Carlsson 2010). This philosophy 
did not align to the research requirements. Finally, interpretivism, which along with constructiv-
ism is used with DSR, believes knowledge grows from the idea that the natural world and the so-
cial world are ontologically different. In contrast, constructivists believe that knowledge develops 
through the researcher’s dealings with the environment (Rahi 2017; Venable 2006; Walsham 




Inductive reasoning is a logical thought progression in which various propositions, all believed 
true or found true the majority of the time, are combined to create a definitive assumption or 
likely conclusion (Lee and Baskerville 2003). Inductive reasoning was chosen for this research 
because of the nature of DSR. The research itself began with specific observations – the design 
principles for the security artifact –and used those principles to develop a recommended way 
forward for the development of a likely artifact that could provide an assumptive solution.   
The other options that were considered for the reasoning approach of this research were deduc-
tive and abductive. Deductive reasoning begins with generalities to a problem and uses those to 
develop a specific solution or answer which is the inverse of the reasoning used for the research, 
so it was not chosen. Abductive reasoning was also not chosen because it did not align to the re-
search, as this type of causal explanation begins with an incomplete set of observations and sug-
gests the likeliest explanation for that set – often referred to as “the simplest and most likely ex-
planation is usually the right one” (Folger and Stein 2017). 
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3.3 Qualitative Research Method 
This research uses grounded theory as the chosen qualitative research method. Four other op-
tions were considered: action research, phenomenology, discourse analysis and ethnography. This section 
now describes the five methods, including the rationale for the choice, how they were analysed to 
identify the best suited for this research and for the qualitative data set that would be developed 
from the questionnaire evaluation of the security artifact.  
Action Research 
Action research is about doing research while in action and is not research about an action. It is 
performed using four phases – planning, action, evaluation and further planning (Coghlan 2019). 
This is similar to the plan, do, check, act Deming cycle (Moen and Norman 2006). In action re-
search, those that are in the study are members of the research team, not participants as is more 
traditional, and the research is done at the same time as the action is taking place, not after 
(Susman and Evered 1978). Due to the length of time to develop the security artifact and because 
action was not at the core of the research, this method was not used. 
Phenomenology 
Phenomenology describes the meaning of an experience lived by understanding the deeper as-
sumptions that the subject already knows. This method is not about the creation of new infor-
mation, but illuminates already understood information to describe the meaning in every day 
phenomenon (Merleau-Ponty 1996; Starks and Brown Trinidad 2007). The intent of this research 
was not to observe other humans during a particular phenomenon, so this research method was 
considered not suitable. 
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Discourse Analysis 
As the name indicates, discourse analysis is concerned with analysing language-in-use and how 
people complete tasks through language. This can include following the historical evolution of a 
language and understanding how that impacts the use of the language in everyday situations. 
(Fairclough and Wodak 1997; Johnstone 2017; Starks and Brown Trinidad 2007). This research 
was not primarily about language and as such this method was not used. 
Ethnography 
Ethnography is one of the most recognised qualitative research methods and involves the re-
searcher spending extensive amounts of time in the field with the participants that they study. It 
is an immersion of a social and cultural situation. Traditionally ethnography was used in anthro-
pology but is now also being used effectively in organisations and information systems. (Brewer 
2000; Hammersley 2007). Due to the dispersion of the security artifact questionnaire participants, 
it was not possible to use ethnography in this research. 
Grounded Theory 
Grounded theory is a methodology by which qualitative analysis is iterative – the data (meaning-
ful concepts from the texts) are collected and separated from the conversation and each data unit 
is assigned codes (Urquhart et al. 2010). The codes are inspected for patterns and then reintegrat-
ed to form dominant thematic subjects and connections. (Starks and Brown Trinidad 2007; 
Strauss and Corbin 1994). The code inspection, or coding, is done iteratively to a level of detail 
that provides a thematic essence of the original data set or texts.  According to Martin & Turner 
(1986) grounded theory is “an inductive, theory of discovery methodology that allows the re-
searcher to develop a theoretical account of the general features of a topic while simultaneously 
grounding the account in empirical observations or data”. This method was chosen to analyse the 
results from our Oppenheim questionnaire about our security artifact because it provided a de-
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tailed methodology which, through each coding phase, produced a synthesis of the themes that 
became richer and more meaningful about the artifact’s utility.  
3.4 Design Science Research 
 
A Design Science Research (DSR) study (Hevner et al. 2004; Nunamaker Jr et al. 1990) suit-
ed the research due to the emphasis on the design and creation of an artifact to test a research 
question (Venable et al. 2016) and the research rigor the DSR methodology provided (Peffers et 
al. 2006; Sein et al. 2011). The choice of DSR for this information systems research was made 
because the DSR research paradigm addresses the real-world applicability versus research rigour 
gap in information systems, by bringing both practical relevance – artifacts, and scientific rigor - 
design theories, to the activity (Baskerville et al. 2018; Benbasat and Zmud 2003; Galliers et al. 
2006). If the research was to be successful, it needed to have a demonstrated use in business but 
also the research thoroughness that was lacking in the existing artifacts identified during the liter-
ature review. 
Vaishnavi & Kuechler (2004) describe the body of DSR knowledge, which this dissertation con-
tributes to, as man-made objects – artifacts – that are designed to meet specific goals. DSR cre-
ates novel contributions through the design of new artifacts including the analysis of their opera-
tion using evaluation and abstraction. It uses design as a research method that maps functional 
requirements on to a fulfilling artifact. The design action is justified using a kernel theory – an es-
tablished theory that, when the new design action is complete, may improve or broaden the pur-
pose of the initial kernel theory. As indicated in Figure 5 there are five steps: 1) Awareness of the 
Problem, 2) Suggestion, 3) Development, 4) Evaluation, and 5) Conclusion.  These are now de-
scribed. 
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Step 1: Awareness of the Problem 
An individual becomes aware of a problem that does not appear to have an existing solution and 
therefore a research proposal is written. For this research, the problem was identified whilst the 
researcher was working in security and wanted to use a holistic security model for the organisa-
tional security approach. Despite the extensive resources of a large Australian Federal Govern-
ment Agency, and strong ties to international partners, academia and industry; there did not ap-
pear to be a demonstrated holistic solution. The problem was then confirmed through a semi-
systematic literature review of holistic security models, which identified that there is a lack of fully 
researched security models looking at security from a complete organisational perspective and 
not just a category of problem, e.g., computer security or human resource security. The literature 
review also confirmed that others had searched for a similarly complete solution for all organisa-
tional security however, it was not available (Angelo 2001; Copeland 2017; Tamm et al. 2011). 
Step 2: Suggestion  
Suggestion is the second step where indications of the first sample of the design idea including 
performance needs of a prototype, are developed. Through the literature review, recommended 
principles for a security model were identified and developed to provide both the design and the 
performance needs of the model. The principles included purpose, type, assurance, kernel theory 
reference, and coverage. 
Step 3: Development  
In Step 3, the design from Step 2 is used to create the artifact. However, it is important to note 
that the emphasis is on the novelty of the design, not the creation of the artifact. The focus of DSR 
is the testing of a new design to solve a problem, the developed artifact supports this testing of 
the design, rather than being the focus itself. Using the principles to guide the design, a security 
architecture framework artifact was created – a thirty-six cell security instantiation or ontology.   
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Step 4: Evaluation  
To evaluate the initial proposal and design, performance measures are placed on the artifact at 
Step 4 and any changes are fed into the design to inform the next design iteration. Using the de-
sign principles and security domain guidelines, the security framework was given to managers, 
security professionals, IT professionals and researchers. The participants were also given a ques-
tionnaire about the utility of the framework, to evaluate and provide the cyclical feedback to in-
form the artifact design process.  
Step 5: Conclusion  
This cyclical evaluation continues until a conclusion is reached – usually the end of the research 
cycle or when the solution is considered “good enough” and the results are written up. The eval-
uation process of the security artifact was concluded with the results being published 
(McClintock et al. 2020). An extended version will also be included in a 2020 book in the "Lec-
ture Notes in Business Information Processing" (LNBIP) series, published by Springer.  
The research is overlaid onto the Outputs column in Figure 5 (coloured red) to demonstrate the 
use of the DSR methodology. 
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Figure 5.  SAFE Outputs in Design Science Research Cycle (Vaishnavi and Kuechler 2004) 
The opportunity for the research was also demonstrated using the DSR Knowledge Contribution 
Framework (Gregor and Hevner 2013) at Figure 6. This framework uses two axes to describe a 
problem in the DSR context. The first is application domain maturity, which describes the con-
text of the problem – for this research, the domains were enterprise architecture and security. 
Both are established domains or in this context have a high level of application domain maturity. 
The second is solution maturity, which indicates the maturity of current existing artifacts to solve 
the research problem being explored. For this research, the solution maturity is low. This placed 
the problem set in the Improvement quadrant and provided the prospect of knowledge contribu-
tion and a research opportunity.  
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Figure 6.  DSR knowledge contribution framework (Gregor and Hevner 2013) 
 
In summary, this chapter has described the methods and philosophies that were chosen to best 
frame the research and address the problem statement “will a holistic security model using En-
terprise Architecture (EA) provide security benefits to an organisation more effectively than a 
piecemeal approach”. The choices ensured that the outcome of the research - the artifact and de-
sign, are both organisationally practical and academically sound. The next chapter will discuss in 
detail, the artifact, how it was developed, and the three layers of abstraction achieved, using the 
methods and philosophies selected.  
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4 Artifact Description 
 
 
“The desire to create is one of the deepest yearnings of the human soul” 
Dieter F Uchtdorf 
 
 
As described in the previous section, this is a DSR study. Therefore, the development of the 
artifact to test a theory which was based on principles was critical. The question being tested is 
“will a holistic security model using EA provide security benefits in an organisation more effec-
tively than a piecemeal approach”. Through the literature review, five design principles were iden-
tified to inform the design, development and evaluation of the artifact to test this question. Those 
principles will be used to frame the following discussion, describing the artifact, how it was de-
veloped and the three layers of abstraction achieved.  
The contributions to practice and knowledge for this research are three-fold. Firstly, the exten-
sion of the Enterprise Architecture Domain – the development of a standardised, comprehensive 
enterprise security architecture. As described above, this is not currently available to a detailed 
level of complexity. Secondly, the Security Domain – the development of the first fully re-
searched security ontology and ESA based on security industry standards and security regulatory 
compliance and practices. This research is compliant with both NIST 800-53 (NIST 2013) and 
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ISO/IEC 27002 (ISO 2013) and will provide an assurance that all aspects or the organisation 
have been considered for security. Finally, the design of a security dimension to the original EA 
framework - Zachman. Previous research which has created security constructs for the Zachman, 
have restricted their scope to a specific organisational focus, such as technical, instead of consid-
ering the organisation as a whole (Kreizman and Robertson 2006). Adherence of an ESA to the 
EA principles from the Zachman extends the utility of the Zachman and provides a security di-
mension which has otherwise been lacking (Copeland 2017). 
The discussion will begin with the Enterprise Architecture Reference principle because this de-
sign feature informed the other principles by providing the structure of the artifact.  
4.1 Enterprise Architecture Reference Design Principle 
For the purposes of this design principle, the EA reference chosen to base the security artifact 
model on, was the Zachman framework 2013 Version 3.0 because it is the most complete, most 
referenced in our frameworks review and historically the methodology that is chosen by others to 
base their frameworks on. The majority of EA frameworks, however, do not have a security 
component (Posthumus and Von Solms 2004). Despite Zachman’s success, it does not include 
security in any form (Zachman 2001). This lack of security has been identified by others 
(Copeland 2017) who have used Zachman to create an enterprise security architecture 
(ESA)(Sherwood et al. 1995). However, the results have been limited and none of the ESA’s to 
date have utilised the Zachman EA concept of an ontology or ensured a strict adherence to the 
original definitions of Zachman (Zachman 1987). Zachman is the ontological language of EA 
and building on this concept, a security implementation of Zachman would be the first security 
ontology available – a defined organisational security language. Furthermore, most existing ESAs 
are from business white papers, and thus lack in-depth case study analysis, experimental  replica-
bility and research exploration  (Tamm et al. 2011). The challenge to do so, however, is the com-
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plexity. A framework that addresses all organisational security requires extensive research in every 
aspect of security, not just a singular framework focused on a specific aspect of security. There 
are some examples in literature (Ertaul and Sudarsanam 2005; Ho 2002; Sherwood et al. 1995), 
however, they have a smaller scope and their purpose is not to cover the entire spectrum of an 
organisation. For example EA security governance frameworks tend to be very top heavy – en-
suring the highest levels of the organisation are fulfilling their legal responsibilities – but do not 
include implementation or technology (Anderson and Choobineh 2008). Also, unlike the increas-
ing academic interest in EA, most of the writings about enterprise security architecture are from 
business white papers and not from academia (Tamm et al. 2011), thus lacking research rigour.  
The comprehensive use of EA in security will also provide a single capture of all the organisa-
tion’s security – a holistic security structure that is not yet available in a mature form. 
All 36 cells of the Zachman framework were explored and researched to determine exactly what 
the purpose of the cell was. This included identifying full definitions for each cell and the outer 
framework terms, and attending a Zachman enterprise architect Level 1 and 2 course with John 
Zachman to clarify any existing questions not answered by the literature review of EA. Once EA 
and security were explored adequately and an expert level of knowledge was achieved, the outer 
edges of the proposed security version of the Zachman framework were identified. To ensure the 
integrity of the principles of EA, it was important to retain the organisational views (the rows) 
and the interrogatives (the columns). 
The following discussion provides a detailed explanation of the rows and columns in the Zach-
man and how they were used to define the security artifact. 
Audience Perspectives / Stages of Reification (the rows) 
The perspectives or rows in the Zachman constitute a complete way to view an organisation, 
from the people who would initially identify the concept for the business (the first row), to the 
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final instantiation of the running organisation (the final row), as described in Section 2.1 and Ta-
ble 3. It was important that the security framework retain the intent of the rows – the whole or-
ganisational view – to provide a complete description of an organisation’s security mechanisms in 
all parts of the organisation. As a security architect worked their way through the framework, the 
security instance would align to the organisational instance.  The security artifact retained the row 
perspectives with no changes – they are Identification, Definition, Representation, Specification, 
Configuration, and Instantiation. As each stage or row of the reification process, moving down 
the framework, is a transformation not a more detailed view of the previous perspective, in the 
original architectural intent, so should the security cells. As a reminder, the rows were defined as: 
 Row 1 - Executive Perspective / Identification: The executive perspective is defined at 
the inception of a company. It is the identification of the concept for the business and is 
externally focused.  
 Row 2 - Business Management Perspective / Definition: The business management per-
spective is internally focused and defines the executive, external concept for the enter-
prise, into a business model of enterprise design and operational reality.  
 Row 3 - Architect Perspective / Representation: The architect perspective represents the 
business model as the required pieces or building blocks of the enterprise and indicates 
how they will interact with each other.  
 Row 4 - Engineer Perspective / Specification: The requirements and specifications of the 
systems of the organisation are designed at the engineering perspective.  
 Row 5 - Technician Perspective / Configuration: The technician perspective is the busi-
ness component level and are implemented using specific tooling configurations.  
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 Row 6 - Enterprise Perspective / Instantiation: The enterprise perspective is the instan-
tiation of the reification process from Row 1 to 5, outworked and demonstrated in the 
functioning organisation.  
Classification Names (the columns) 
The columns of the framework are the English interrogatives and provide the detail of each row 
or organisational view. A more detailed explanation of the columns can be found in Section 2.1 
and Table 2. While the interrogatives were retained, where the differentiation came, was the an-
swers to the interrogative questions. For example, the Zachman “what” column asks the question 
“what is the most important asset for the organisation” and the Zachman answer is “inventory 
sets”. Whereas the security question for the “what” column is “what is the organisation’s most 
important asset that needs to be secured” and the answer is “information”. All columns of the 
security artifact were addressed in the same way – each having a security question asked of the 
interrogative rather than the Zachman question, by doing so, the integrity of the Zachman was 
retained but the security instance was created. Table 10 shows the original Zachman framework 
interrogative definitions alongside the security artifact definition. 
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Interrogative Zachman Definition Security Artifact Definition 
What - Things The inventory sets, people or infor-
mation, that are tracked and managed 
for the organisation to function. 
The organisation’s most important asset is 
information and this is what is being se-
cured. Labelled “Information” in the arti-
fact. 
How - Process The processing of the organisation 
through various process types which 
provide the transformation models of 
the assets. 
How the organisation secures the infor-
mation. At the conceptual level, the security 
mechanisms are processes through to the 
final level of instantiations which are security 
technologies. Labelled “Security Mecha-
nism” in the artifact. 
Where - Loca-
tion 
Distribution networks depicted using 
network models. Includes business, 
system, technology or tool locations. 
Where the organisation’s security is con-
ducted. Can be a physical or logical location. 
Labelled “Location Security” in the arti-
fact. 
Who - People The responsibility assignments are 
allocated to the organisational stake-
holders and can be internal or exter-
nal. 
The people of the organisation, which can 
be defined as both internal and external 
stakeholders, require various forms of secu-
rity. Labelled “People Security” in the arti-
fact. 
When - Events Timing cycles, the intervals and mo-
ments of the organisation and how 
those are identified as types, defined, 
represented, specified and configured 
within the architecture and the organi-
sation. 
When the organisation has determined will 
be the most effective security timing cycles 
to provide a secure organisation. Examples 
include compliance, policy, assessment, audit 
and reviews. Labelled “Security Cycles” in 
the artifact. 
Why - Ends The objectives and strategies explain 
why the organisation is in business, 
how those motivations and intentions 
are outworked through ends and 
means. 
The essential motivation why security is the 
risk of an event occurring which would 
damage an organisational asset. The man-
agement of that risk is outworked as security 
- a determination of the strengths, weak-
nesses, opportunities and threats; and the 
appropriate mitigation strategies deployed. 
Labelled “Risk Management” in the arti-
fact 
Table 10. Column Definitions – Zachman vs Security Artifact 
With the row and column definitions completed, each of the 36 cells of the artifact were defined 
using these definitions. For example, Cell 1 – the Row 1 audience perspective or reification stage 
is defined as “Identification” and the Column 1 answer to the interrogative What, is “Infor-
mation”, therefore the cell’s primitive security model is “Information Identification”. As de-
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scribed in Chapter 2, a primitive model is the classification name of a required element in an EA 
framework – in this case these are the required elements of the security framework, the primitive 
security models. This design process continued until all cells were completed and the outcome 
can be found in Figure 7. 
 
Figure 7:  Primitive security models of the artifact (in blue) 
4.2 Framework Type Design Principle  
This design principle required that each cell be defined using ontological instances rather than 
artifact-based instances so that organisations would be free to choose their own implementation 
of the cell rather than be required to find a specific artifact. The purpose is for organisations to 
be able to consider security in all their facets of business, regardless of the organisations’ size, fi-
nancial position or industry, which a categorisation or ontological framework provides. Using the 
detailed research process that was conducted to understand the original Zachman cell intent, and 
then a thorough research process, including the initial semi-systematic literature review, to under-
stand how organisational security related to each cell, authentic ontological security instances 
were developed for all 36 cells. For example, the “Risk Management Definition” cell – the re-
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search conducted was to understand “What is the instrument that an organisation would use to 
define risk management?” The answer from research for this cell is Risk Management Policy and 
that answer, therefore, became the instantiation. The outcome of this design process – the securi-
ty instantiations of each cell – can be found in Figure 8. A detailed explanation of every cell, the 
questions that were asked, the research conducted, the definitions and purpose of each cell, the 
pictorial model, the compliance mapping and real-world example artifacts, can be found in Sec-
tion 4.5. 
 
Figure 8:  Security instantiation of the primitive security models (in blue) 
4.3 Security Compliance / Assurance Design Principle  
This principle required that a security framework be compliant to an internationally recognised 
security standard. The two most referenced in the literature review were ISO/IEC 27002 (ISO 
2013) and NIST 800-53 (NIST 2013) therefore both were used for security assurance of the arti-
fact. Table 11 is the compliance summary for 31 cells of the artifact. The five that are not includ-
ed are the first five in the column “What”, which were omitted because the entire column is 
about the information of the organisation. The security compliance standards do not differentiate 
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from the type of information therefore the final cell in the column, which is the enterprise instan-
tiation of information, represents the entire column.   
SAFE PRIMI-
TIVE MODELS 
ISO/IEC 27002 CONTROLS  
(ISO 2013) 













Information Security Policies; Organisa-
tion of Information Security; Compliance; 
Certification and Accreditation and Security As-




Information Security Policies; Organisa-
tion of Information Security;  




Asset Management; Operations Security; 
Communications Security; System Acquisi-
tion, Development and Maintenance; 
System and Services Acquisition; Media Protec-




Information Security Policies; Organisa-
tion of Information Security;  
Planning; Certification and Accreditation and 





Organisation of Information Security; 
Access Control; Cryptography; Operations 





Access Control; Physical / Environmental 
Security; Information Security Aspects of 
Business Continuity; 
System and Services Acquisition; Physical and 
Environmental Protection; Maintenance; Media 





Access Control; Physical / Environmental 
Security;  
Physical and Environmental Protection; System 
and Information Integrity; Identification and Au-
thentication; Access Control; Audit and Account-




Access Control; Physical / Environmental 
Security; Operations Security; 
Risk Assessment; Planning; Physical and Envi-




Asset Management; Access Control; Phys-
ical / Environmental Security; System 
Acquisition, Development and Mainte-
nance; 
Physical and Environmental Protection; Media 





Physical / Environmental Security; Infor-
mation Security Aspects of Business Con-
tinuity; 
Risk Assessment; Planning; Physical and Envi-





Human Resource Security; Access Con-
trol; Physical / Environmental Security; 
Supplier Relationships; 
System and Information Integrity; Identification 
and Authentication; Access Control; Audit and 




Human Resource Security; Supplier Rela-
tionships; 
Personnel Security; Awareness and Training; 
People Security 
Definition 
Information Security Policies; Human 
Resource Security; Supplier Relationships; 
Personnel Security; Awareness and Training; 
People Security 
Representation 
Human Resource Security; Access Con-
trol; Supplier Relationships; 
Personnel Security; Awareness and Training; 
Identification and Authentication; Access Con-
trol; 
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Human Resource Security; Supplier Rela-
tionships; 
Personnel Security; Awareness and Training; 
People Security 
Configuration 
Human Resource Security; Supplier Rela-
tionships; 
Personnel Security; Awareness and Training; 
People Security 
Instantiation 
Human Resource Security; Access Con-
trol; Supplier Relationships; 
Personnel Security; Awareness and Training; 
Security Cycles 
Identification 
Organisation of Information Security; 
Compliance; 
Certification and Accreditation and Security As-
sessments; Audit and Accountability; 
Security Cycles 
Definition 




Organisation of Information Security; 
Compliance; 
Planning; Certification and Accreditation and 
Security Assessments; Audit and Accountability; 
Security Cycles 
Specification 
Compliance; Risk Assessment; Certification and Accreditation 
and Security Assessments; System and Infor-
mation Integrity; Audit and Accountability; 
Security Cycles 
Configuration 
Operations Security; Information Security 
Incident Management; Information Securi-
ty Aspects of Business Continuity; Com-
pliance; 
Planning; Certification and Accreditation and 
Security Assessments; Maintenance; System and 
Information Integrity; Audit and Accountability; 
Security Cycles 
Instantiation 
Operations Security; Information Security 
Incident Management; Information Securi-
ty Aspects of Business Continuity; Com-
pliance; 
Risk Assessment; Certification and Accreditation 
and Security Assessments; Contingency Planning; 
System and Information Integrity; Incident Re-
sponse; Awareness and Training; Audit and Ac-





Information Security Policies; Organisa-
tion of Information Security; Supplier 






Information Security Policies; Organisa-
tion of Information Security; Supplier 






Information Security Policies; Organisa-
tion of Information Security; Supplier 
Relationships; Information Security Inci-
dent Management; 





Information Security Policies; Organisa-
tion of Information Security; Supplier 
Relationships; Information Security Inci-
dent Management; 





Information Security Policies; Organisa-
tion of Information Security; Supplier 
Relationships; Information Security Inci-
dent Management; 
Risk Assessment; System and Information Integ-




Information Security Policies; Organisa-
tion of Information Security; Supplier 
Relationships; Information Security Inci-
dent Management; 
Risk Assessment; Personnel Security; Contingen-
cy Planning; Incident Response; Awareness and 
Training;  
Table 11:   Artifact security compliance mapping to NIST 800-53 and ISO/IEC 27002 
Michelle Graham - Enterprise Security Architecture – Mythology or Methodology 
 
Dissertation for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy – School of Computer Science, University of Adelaide 
Page 67 
4.4 Framework Coverage and Framework Purpose Design Principles 
Remaining consistent to the design principle of EA and the rules of the Zachman, the two 
principles of framework coverage and framework purpose have also been complied with. 
Framework coverage emphasises the need for the entire organisation to be considered when im-
plementing security, and not just singular departments – a holistic framework. Framework pur-
pose speaks to the organisation’s assets – people, process, technology and information all should 
be considered when securing an organisation. EA is both a holistic instrument and covers all of 
an organisation’s assets therefore the use of it in the design of the artifact, achieved both design 
principles.  
4.5 The 36 Cells of the Artifact  
Once the high-level categories were defined for each cell, the detail needed to be developed to 
explain what each cell actually meant. Also, whilst the high-level definition provided the matching 
Zachman column / row reference for each security cell, the specific security ontological con-
struct needed to be defined for user guidance when evaluating the framework. This resulted in 
four factors being defined. Those were: 
1. Detailed explanation – what is the definition and purpose of the cell 
2. Pictorial model – a pictorial description for ease of understanding to users 
3. Artifact example – show the use of the cell using a real-world example 
4. Compliance mapping to ISO/IEC 27002 and NIST 800-53 
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Cell Definitions 
Cell 1 – Information Identification (Corporate Concept) 
The concept of the corporation is the description the organisation provides to external parties 
when explaining what the company does and what it is that differentiates itself from other corpo-
rations. Often considered the initial seed idea that begins the company and is eventually matured 
into a detailed description which will give a clear indication of what information the company will 
consider proprietary. Ultimately it will become the vision, mission and philosophy the company is 
founded on. Security should be used in service to the corporate concept (Anderson 2008) – the 
essence of what the organisation is trying to achieve; therefore the security framework needs the 
corporate concept as the kernel for all other cells to draw from and be influenced by. 
 
Cell 2 – Security Mechanism Identification (Security Mandate) 
One of the critical success factors of organisational security is the identification of the need for 
security within an organisation at the executive level. If senior management are seen to be en-
dorsing and championing security, it is more likely to become a cultural norm. To demonstrate 
the significance to the organisation, security is included in the corporate vision, mission and phi-
losophy (Anderson 2008; ISO 2013). At this executive level, there are no detailed security plans 
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however, an acknowledgement of security and the risk it mitigates in the most senior organisa-
tional document, can become the key driver for organisational security practices, process and 
programs (Plachkinova and Maurer 2019).  
 
Cell 3 – Location Security Identification (Physical Security) 
Due to the complex nature of organisations, physical security is no longer limited to the access of 
a building. Physical security now provides for the physically securing of all assets in the organisa-
tion including, people, technology, information and processes (Fennelly 2016). 
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Cell 4 – People Security Identification (Personnel Security Management) 
At the executive conceptual level, people provide the largest challenge for security. From the be-
ginning of a person joining or associating with an organisation, security training, keeping the in-
dividual safe, the identification and authentication of the person to the organisational systems and 
finally the termination process of the employee when they leave or disassociate with the compa-
ny; are the most complex processes in an enterprise (Zafar 2013). The goal is to concurrently 
keep the people, the information and the assets secure, and this is derived from the corporate 
level commitment statement at the concept of the enterprise (Kirlappos and Sasse 2014). 
 
Cell 5 – Security Cycles Identification (Security Compliance) 
At the executive level, organisations have an external security responsibility which can be legal, 
statutory, regulatory or contractual. The requirements to ensure the security within the organisa-
tion is in compliance with industry relevant standards, is often legislated and the reporting, man-
datory. In addition to these compulsory requirements, organisations also have a moral responsi-
bility to ensure the security of their staff, information, processes and technology. Security compli-
ance provides a cyclic framework and process model to meet these obligations (Siponen et al. 
2010; Vance et al. 2012). 
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Cell 6 – Risk Management Identification (Risk Management) 
The risk management statement is a corporate statement to external interested parties that de-
scribes the risk appetite and boundaries of the organisation. It expresses exactly what the compa-
ny will and will not tolerate and how strongly they will implement safeguards and solutions to 
mitigate identified or potential risks (Lam 2014). The statement also identifies who is responsible 
in the organisation for risk and explains, usually based on culture, values or vision, where the risk 
appetite is motivated from – what the business drivers for risk are (Mayer et al. 2019; Webb et al. 
2014). This statement is usually embedded in the corporate vision and may be incorporated with 
the security mandate. 
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Cell 7 – Information Definition (Enterprise Information) 
The information that is required for the organisation to function is defined here. It is initially a 
transformation from the corporate concept and evolves into all of the enterprise information that 
is used by the organisation for business to occur (Kirk 1999). 
 
Cell 8 – Security Mechanism Definition (Security Governance) 
A part of the organisational governance framework, security governance is the inclusion of a 
commitment to the securing of an organisation’s information, its greatest asset, at the highest lev-
el – usually the board of directors or the CEO. This may include regulatory or statutory require-
ments and is the mechanism by which security is conceptualised within the organisation and pro-
vides a framework for the security to be implemented organisationally. It should include risk 
management and strategic alignment of security with business strategy (De Haes et al. 2013; 
Fitzgerald 2011; Moulton and Coles 2003). 
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Cell 9 – Location Security Definition (Access Control) 
Fundamentally, physical or locational security is access control. Being externally focused, it is the 
restriction of unauthorised external entities accessing organisational information whether that 
information be stored on a computer, in a filing cabinet, on a server or at a geographical location. 
Access control is normally managed through a layered approach. Those on the outer layers have 
zero access and those on the innermost layer have the highest level of access. The access changes 
as the entities role or need for the information changes. For example a line manager may have 
specific file access to their relevant staff information however, the managing director may have 
access to all staff (Anderson 2008; Sandhu et al. 1996; Sandhu and Samarati 1994). 
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Cell 10 – People Security Definition (Personnel Security Policy) 
Internally focused, the personnel security policy provides the detailed guidelines and direction for 
the organisation. It is derived from the personnel security statement and articulates the organisa-
tional commitment to a personnel security program that includes identification and authentica-
tion, hiring and termination practices, the safety of people who interact with the company in any 
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Cell 11 – Security Cycles Definition (Security Compliance Policy) 
The security compliance policy is an internal business management tool that describes, for the 
organisation, what security standards will be implemented in the organisation, how often they will 
be audited and the level of commitment to the process the business stakeholders should expect 
(Ifinedo 2012; NIST 2013; Safa et al. 2016). 
 
Cell 12 – Risk Management Definition (Risk Management Policy) 
The risk management policy provides a clear intention to internal staff of the organisation’s 
commitment to risk management and is the guidance for the implementation of the risk man-
agement statement. Broadly, it should provide the purpose and scope of the policy, place the in-
formation in context with the organisation’s business management, define the risk management 
model that is being used and specify responsibilities and roles within the organisation. (Hopkin 
2018; Lam 2014; Mayer et al. 2019; Webb et al. 2014)  
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Cell 13 – Information Representation (Enterprise Architecture) 
EA states that an organisation is at least as complex as a large construction project and should be 
engineered using the same process; the context, the concept, the design, the build, the implemen-
tation and the use.  EA provides a link between organisational goals and mission statements, 
through the organisational layers, down to the project level, just as an initial engineering concept 
document is traceable to a final built product. The organisation’s assets are defined in EA as peo-
ple, information, process and technology, and these are used to implement the vision of the or-
ganisation (DoD 2010; Gampfer et al. 2018; Gerber et al. 2020; Mentz et al. 2014; Zachman 
2015). 
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Cell 14 – Security Mechanism Representation (Enterprise Security Architecture) 
The security mechanism used for representation of security in the organisation is enterprise secu-
rity architecture. It is a holistic strategy that includes all security controls (not just IT security) in 
the organisation and places them in the most advantageous position. This organisational view 
provides an assurance that the organisation is meeting its corporate and moral requirements for 
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Cell 15 – Location Security Representation (Site & Facility Secure Design) 
The secure design of facilities and sites is the first line of physical defence for organisations. 
Whether the facility be existing or a new site, the security design process can be applied for max-
imum benefit. The design will at least include secure designs for neighbourhood, perimeter, ac-
cess and parking, operations and the building (DiMase et al. 2015; Fennelly 2016; Peltier 2013). 
 
Cell 16 – People Security Representation (Personnel Security Plan) 
The personnel security plan is derived from the personnel security policies. It is the high level 
building block from which the procedures and security program are created. How the processes 
will interact with each other and the technologies which may be used are formalised.  The con-
cepts of the personnel security plan are translated to the actions that will achieve the personnel 
security policy goals (Clark et al. 2014; Höne and Eloff 2002; ISO 2013). 
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Cell 17 – Security Cycles Representation (Certification Framework) 
The security certification framework has already been named in the security compliance policy 
and is now articulated in detail. The framework is used to audit for compliance and assurance and 
will include enough detail for organisational accountability. The security framework will cover all 
aspects of the organisation (ISO 2013; NIST 2013; Whitman and Mattord 2011). 
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Cell 18 – Risk Management Representation (Risk Management Plan) 
According to ISO 31000:2009, a risk management plan is one that systematically applies man-
agement policies, procedures, and practices to a set of activities intended to establish the context, 
communicate and consult with stakeholders, and identify, analyse, evaluate, treat, monitor, and 
review risk (Hopkin 2018; Lam 2014; Mayer et al. 2019). 
 
Cell 19 – Information Specification 
The organisational information strategy is a management instrument that ensures information 
assets of the organisation are linked to the delivery of the organisation's mission. It will include 
the purpose, strategic direction, responsibilities, reporting and the detailed requirements and 
specifications for the use of the information assets. Security is an intrinsic and an explicit part of 
the information strategy (Applegate et al. 2006; Malhotra 2000; Orna 2017). 
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Cell 20 – Security Mechanism Specification (Security Operations, Infrastructure and Processes) 
The security controls policy and the architectures developed from Rows 2 and 3 become physi-
cally depicted in the security operations, infrastructure and processes. This is where the tradition-
ally held view of information security can be found such as security mechanisms for applications, 
operating systems and networks. It also extends to hardware, infrastructure and process security 
(Anderson 2008; Gollmann 2010; McCrie 2015). 
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Cell 21 – Location Security Specification (Physical and Logical Asset Security) 
Physical security restricts the physical access to buildings but also includes restricting the access 
to the physical aspects of computing like system hardware and wiring. Logical security is the use 
of information and communications technology to restrict the logical access to the information 
and systems in an organisation. Combining these two strategies provides a greater level of securi-
ty than the individual components and achieves a strong defence-in-depth security model 
(DiMase et al. 2015; Fennelly 2016; Lindsay 2009). 
 
Cell 22 – People Security Specification (Personnel Security Procedures) 
The personnel security procedures are the detailed specifications of the personnel security pro-
cess. It is a physical depiction of how the processes are to be conducted. The procedures often 
include who is responsible, where it will be done and how. Step by step, sequenced instructions 
are included for each personnel security procedure. The procedures are tested and proven before 
being implemented (Peltier 2016; Zafar 2013). 
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Cell 23 – Security Cycles Specification (Security Assessment) 
Once implemented, the organisation must be assessed for compliance against the security certifi-
cation framework. This process is called security assessment and measures the degree to which 
security system controls are correctly implemented, whether they are functioning as anticipated 
and whether they are generating the desired level of security (Clinch 2009; Jordan et al. 2018; 




Michelle Graham - Enterprise Security Architecture – Mythology or Methodology 
 
Dissertation for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy – School of Computer Science, University of Adelaide 
Page 84 
Cell 24 – Risk Management Specification (SWOT Analysis) 
A strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats (SWOT) analysis identifies the internal 
strengths and weaknesses, as well as its external opportunities and threats of an organisation. The 
purpose is to provide a detailed list of risks that could adversely affect the organisation and de-
cide how these should be managed. Additionally the advantages the organisation has are also 
available to be leveraged into the business model (Akman 2019; Gürel and Tat 2017; NIST 2010). 
 
Cell 25 – Information Configuration (Information Systems) 
The systems that manage the informational assets of the organisation and are used to collect, fil-
ter, process, create and distribute the information for the purpose of achieving the corporate 
strategy (Acuña 2016; DeLone and McLean 2016; Galliers et al. 2006). 
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Cell 26 – Security Mechanism Configuration (Security Lifecycle Management) 
Security within an organisation should be constantly monitored, evaluated and improved when 
necessary. It is not a static program that is put in place and never visited again. The Deming cycle 
of Plan, Do, Check, Act provides a good basis for a security lifecycle which should be a part of 
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Cell 27 – Location Security Configuration (Physical and Environmental Protection) 
Physical and environmental security and protection takes asset security one step further. It in-
cludes all threats to the physical environment of the organisation, particularly non-nefarious 
threats. These can include fire, flood, storms, power outages, interruption to business, chemical 
spills and electromagnetic interference. The protection is in the form of proactive planning and 
securing of the organisational information against these kinds of threats and often includes such 
measures as offsite backup mechanisms (Comfort 2005; Snedaker 2013; Stanton 2005). 
 
Cell 28 – People Security Configuration (Personnel Security Program) 
The implemented vision of the personnel security statement is the personnel security program. It 
is the organisational program that includes all aspects of personnel security that are conducted to 
keep people secure. This includes securing access by people to organisational information and 
assets; ensuring the hiring and termination of people is conducted in a secure manner; the safety 
of staff, contractors and any person who interacts with the organisation; and the ongoing security 
training of personnel (Wilson and Hash 2003; Zafar 2013). 
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Cell 29 – Security Cycles Configuration (Audit Review, Analysis and Reporting) 
Once the security assessment or audit is complete, an action plan is done which involves review, 
analysis and reporting of the audit. The results of the security assessment are weighed using a risk 
assessment process (see column 6, row 5) and a strategy is developed for any non-compliance 
items. The outcome is the re-alignment of the organisation with the security compliance policy 
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Cell 30 – Risk Management Configuration (Risk Assessment) 
Risk assessment involves the evaluation and estimation of the levels of risks for each identified 
weakness and threat produced from the SWOT analysis. This is done using a likelihood versus 
consequence matrix where the likelihood that the risk will occur is compared against the conse-
quences if the risk were to occur. A risk level is assigned and based on this level, the risk is ap-
propriately managed (NIST 2014; Zio 2018). 
 
Cell 31 – Information Instantiation (Information Management) 
The management of the information assets for an organisation is a part of the instantiated daily 
business. It is the ownership and distribution of information to stakeholders within and outside 
of the company. This management can also involve the archival or deletion of the information. 
The purpose is to achieve the organisation’s vision, mission and philosophy through the effective 
use of the corporate information (Kirk 1999; Prajogo et al. 2018). 
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Cell 32 – Security Mechanism Instantiation (Information Security) 
At this level in the framework, information security is the day to day business of executing in-
formation security. The protection of the informational asset of the business in all its forms 
(Anderson 2001; Clinch 2009; Sherwood et al. 1995). 
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Cell 33 – Location Security Instantiation (Identity and Access Management) 
The daily business of an organisation relies on the identification and authorisation of the correct 
people to access the organisation data and information and the repudiation of the nefarious at-
tackers. Identity and access management is the system that keeps this process secure and can in-
clude tracking, auditing and management of users data (Adams and Sasse 1999; Haren 2011; ISO 
2013). 
 
Cell 34 – People Security Instantiation (Personnel Security Practices) 
Personnel security practices are the detailed daily business of the personnel security program. 
They are how the program is implemented in the organisation, also called the instantiation of the 
personnel security statement. The practices are not static but are planned, assessed and reviewed 
regularly to ensure effective personnel security (Clark et al. 2014; Korpela 2015; Panchenko et al. 
2018). 
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Cell 35 – Security Cycles Instantiation (Incident Management) 
At an operational level, the daily business of security compliance is the continuous monitoring, 
audit events and investigations. The cycle of incident management begins with the planning and 
preparation for potential security incidents and ends with the response to the incident and lessons 
learned after the incident (Metzger et al. 2011; Shen et al. 2009; Tøndel et al. 2014).  
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Cell 36 – Risk Management Instantiation (Risk Treatment) 
Once risks are identified and a risk level has been allocated, a treatment should be applied. The 
treatment or mitigation of the risk is based on the impact the risk may have on the organisation 
and there are various choices. Most importantly it is ok to accept a risk and take no action – but 
this must be a decision that has been made, not a default. The time it takes to develop a treat-
ment can be costly and time consuming, so it is important to begin with the highest-level risks 
and work down to the lowest level, balancing the costs with the resulting benefits (Hopkin 2018; 
Purdy 2010; Zio 2018). 
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4.6 The Security Architecture Framework for Enterprises Artifact   
In summary, the notional artifact was completed and three layers of abstraction developed. 
The primitive security models - row / column categories; the security instantiations of the primi-
tive security models - detailed security definitions; and the ontological security cell definitions - 
pictorial model, artifact example and compliance mapping. The final framework is compliant with 
the five guiding design principles identified in Chapter 2 by the literature review and the frame-
work survey. Figure 9 is the completed Security Architecture Framework for Enterprises (SAFE) 
artifact. The evaluation by expert industry participants of the SAFE artifact will be described in 
the next chapter. 
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Figure 9:  The Security Architecture Framework for Enterprises (SAFE) artifact 
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“It is not the strongest of the species that survive, not the most intelligent,  




The final artifact design to be tested with participants, as described in Chapter 4 and Figure 9, 
is the 36 cell Security Architecture Framework for Enterprises (SAFE), with the supporting doc-
umentation which included the cell definitions and purpose, the pictorial model, the real-world 
artifact example and the security standard compliance mapping. The evaluation employed, an 
Oppenheim structured expert evaluation survey, was created with questions designed to elicit in-
dications from a group of participants about the artifact in terms of the efficacy – does the arti-
fact produce the intended results, validity – is the artifact factually sound, utility – is the artifact fit 
for purpose, and quality – when compared to other similar security frameworks, is there a degree 
of excellence; and to confirm if the artifact design met the design principles explained in the 
Background and Literature Review. The responses were gathered and an inductive grounded the-
ory qualitative analysis was completed to derive the foremost themes indicated by the partici-
Michelle Graham - Enterprise Security Architecture – Mythology or Methodology 
 
Dissertation for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy – School of Computer Science, University of Adelaide 
Page 96 
pants. The survey, its design, the participants and the analysis process will all be discussed in this 
chapter.   
5.1 Evaluation Survey Design 
Within Design Science Research (DSR) studies, there are two types of evaluation actions 
which can be taken to evaluate an artifact. The first is artificial evaluation – creating a non-
realistic situation in which to assess the artifact. Examples include laboratory experiments, simu-
lations, mathematical proofs and theoretical arguments. The second is naturalistic evaluation – 
the testing of the artifact in a real-world environment such as an organisation or with experts 
from the field of research. Examples include action research, surveys, case studies and field ex-
periments. For the purposes of the evaluation of the SAFE artifact, a naturalistic evaluation was 
chosen due to the emphasis and effectiveness of the research as a practical application in the real-
world, the low risk to users and the increased quality of the knowledge outcomes from a natural-
istic evaluation versus an artificial one.  (Venable 2006; Venable et al. 2016) The naturalistic eval-
uation tool chosen was a participant survey of experts in the security and architecture field of re-
search.  
To gather the participant’s inputs a survey / questionnaire was designed using an Oppenheim 
(1992) approach and following a successful rigorous ethical research approval process, distributed 
the survey. The Oppenheim approach was published in 1992 with further detail published in 
2000 and 2017, and is purely dedicated to the design of questionnaires and surveys. It has now 
become a seminal work for the development of surveys (Rowley 2012), and other survey design 
research has drawn key principles from the original book (Fowler Jr 2013; Gillham 2008; Gray 
2013). The 1992 Oppenheim text provides detailed advice including on the length, clarity, gram-
mar and specificity of the questions and using these prescriptive methods, attempts to avoid such 
bias in questions as social desirability, double barrelled questions and negatively worded ques-
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tions. It also provides detailed description on the survey planning, wording, measurement and 
actual statements. The Oppenheim design approach does this through detailed descriptions of 
the right and wrong way to phrase a question to a participant and gives example surveys in the 
Appendix. There are also workshops throughout the text for practice and learning. (Oppenheim 
1992; Oppenheim 2000; Williams 2003) The type of responses gathered from an Oppenheim 
survey lend itself to provide effective inputs to the grounded theory qualitative analysis conduct-
ed in this research, described in Chapter 3, as grounded theory produces theories and thematic 
results that fit with the real-world based on grounded empirical data – the survey responses 
(Gregory 2011).  
5.2 Evaluation Survey  
Using the techniques described and the Oppenheim method, the survey was designed and de-
veloped to answer the research question detailed in Chapter 1, the design principles explained in 
Chapter 2 and the dimensions of efficacy, utility, validity and quality. As indicated in Table 12 and 
13, the survey was made up of two sections. The first section was used to elicit demographic in-
formation about the participants, and the second section was for the evaluation of the artifact 
and its design. Each question was developed with specific goals in mind to satisfy the evaluation 
and are indicated in Table 12 and 13.  
The survey is made up of five demographic questions - including security industry experience, job 
category, years of expertise; and 14 questions aimed at drawing out selected aspects of the initial 
research question and expert opinions of the design. Table 12 provides the demographic ques-
tions and the reason they were included in the survey. 
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Demographic Question Purpose of Question 




 Other… please state… 
Background information on the participant’s em-
ployment. 
 
Q2. How large is the company you work for? 
 Small (1-19 employees) 
 Medium (20-199 employees) 
 Large (200+ employees) 
The size of organisation they are employed could 
indicate the extent to which they have experienced 
or implemented security programs. The categories 
are based on the Australian Bureau of Statistics def-
inition. 
Q3. Which of the following best describes your role? 
 Manager 
 Security professional 
 IT professional 
 Other… please state… 
Background information on the participant’s posi-
tion in their organisation. 
 
Q4. How many years have you been in this role? 
 0-2 years 
 3-5 years 
 6-10 years 
 10+ years 
Indicates the level of expertise in their current role. 
 
Q5. Do you or have you ever worked in the security 
industry? 
 Yes… how many years? 
 No 
Indicates the level of security industry expertise. 
 
 
Table 12.  Demographic survey questions and purpose 
 
There were 14 questions in the second section of the survey intended to evaluate the artifact and 
its design. The questions were intended to provide overall thematic characterisations of the 
framework, address the principles for design and the four dimensions of validity, efficacy, utility 
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and quality, and therefore provide indicative answers to the research question. Table 13 provides 
the 14 questions and the design principle(s) they are mapped to or the purpose for inclusion. 
Artifact Survey Questions Design Principle Mapping / Question Purpose 
Q1. What is the biggest security challenge facing 
organisations today? 
Background security question to help participants 
begin thinking about security in preparation for 
completing the survey.  
Q2. Referencing the background information and 
the framework, please indicate if you believe any 
security categories or elements are missing and 
should be included? 
Principle 1, Principle 2, Principle 3 and validity. 
Q3. Do you believe a holistic approach to security 
is likely to provide a more secure organisation? 
Why or why not? 
Principle1, Principle 5 and efficacy. 
Q4. Do you believe a holistic approach to security 
is likely to help with financial decision making for 
security resources? Why or why not? 
Principle 5 
Q5. Does the use of a framework with all possible 
security categories included provide assurance to 
the process of securing an organisation? Why or 
why not? 
Principle 2, Principle 3 
Q6. After inputting an organisations security 
mechanisms into the framework, cell by cell, do 
you believe you could see the security gaps in an 
organisation and determine what else needs to be 
secured? Why or why not? 
Principle 1, Principle 5, efficacy and utility. 
Q7. Would the analysis from a completed security 
framework help senior management or the CEO 
make security decisions or provide beneficial 
management information? Please give an exam-
ple. 
Principle 1, Principle 4, Principle 5 and utility. 
Q8. What do you see as the benefits or features of 
the framework for an organisation using it? 
Anecdotal free text from participants to encourage 
additional response not brought out by previous 
questions and focused on the utility and quality of 
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the artifact. 
Q9. What are the problems or challenges of the 
framework for an organisation using it? Can they 
be solved? 
Anecdotal free text from participants to encourage 
additional response not brought out by previous 
questions and focused on the challenges of the arti-
fact. 
Q10. This framework is compliant to NIST 800-
53 and ISO27002 (international security industry 
standards). Does this information give you more 
confidence in the framework? Is the compliance 
important to you? 
Principle 3, validity and quality. 
Q11. Is the framework easy to understand and 
use? Why or why not? 
Utility, quality and efficacy. 
Q12. Does it help to have the security categories 
broken down into organisational levels (the row 
perspectives)? Why or why not? 
Principle 2, Principle 4 
Q13. Have you found the framework and the 
background information educational? Please give 
an example. 
Anecdotal free text from participants to encourage 
additional response not brought out by previous 
questions and focused on education. Supports utility 
and validity. 
Q14. Please provide any final thoughts on the 
theory, framework and supporting documenta-
tion? 
Anecdotal free text from participants to encourage 
additional response not brought out by previous 
questions. 
Table 13.  Artifact survey questions and design principle mapping 
5.3 Survey Participants 
The artifact and supporting documentation was shared for critique to 4 four categories of pro-
fessionals – manager, security professional, IT professional and researcher, 22 requests in total. 
The four categories were selected to represent the significant users of the artifact and those who 
would gain the greatest benefits if the artifact was successful. The initially identified cohorts and 
the perceived benefits (noting duplication is intentional) were:  
 Manager – develop a security program, support decision making in security investment 
and resourcing, support prioritisation of activities, include privacy and human factors 
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into security program, shared security language across organisation, organisational risk 
management and compliance, demonstration of due care and governance, secure sup-
ply chain, budgetary efficiency 
 Security Professional – understand current security status, develop a security program, 
describe security requirements to stakeholders, demonstrate need for change or im-
provements in security posture, support prioritisation of activities, collaboration op-
portunities 
 IT Professional – identify tools and technology to support security, develop technolo-
gy profiles and roadmaps with security posture, collaboration opportunities, secure 
technology assets 
 Researcher – develop academic understanding of enterprise security architecture, col-
laboration opportunities 
Of the 22 requests six respondents indicated they did not have the expertise to provide an ap-
propriate response and when probed further had little to no expertise in security, architecture or 
information technology despite working in technology organisations, and 4 of the professionals 
did not respond at all.  Of the 12 respondents who became participants, 75% were employed by a 
large company (200+ employees), 17% were from a small (1-19 employees) and 8% from a me-
dium (20-199 employees). 42 % had security industry experience and 75% had been in their cur-
rent role for more than 10 years and considered themselves experts in the field.  The participants 
came from Industry (58%), Government (33%) or the Military (8%). 
The participants were asked to review the framework and supporting documentation in the con-
text of their own organisations and their expertise, carefully considering the utility of the design 
and its application in a working environment and compared to their current security situation.  
To test the utility, the participants worked through each cell and determined if their organisation 
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has a suitable security instance of the requirements indicated for that cell, using the provided ex-
planatory notes. Just as an EA framework can build an organisation from its inception, so the 
security dimension created should functionally be able to build security into all aspects of the or-
ganisation. Theoretically a form of an organisational security ontology.  
5.4 Evaluation Survey Results Analysis 
The survey responses were collated from the participants and the grounded theory method, 
described in Chapter 3, was used to draw out themes through an inductive data collection, ana-
lyse the results from the questionnaire about the framework, and enable the participants to tell 
the story. The grounded theory is a methodology by which qualitative analysis is iterative – the 
data (meaningful concepts, in this case the survey responses) are collected and each data unit is 
assigned codes. The codes are inspected for patterns and then reintegrated to form dominant 
thematic subjects and connections. (Starks and Brown Trinidad 2007; Strauss and Corbin 
1994)Through the cyclical nature of the grounded theory methodology, each coding phase pro-
vides richer thematic results.  
To explain the process - an example question from the survey: “Have you found the framework 
and background information educational?” The first coding phase saw 13 participant responses: 
 Shows the full extent of issues involved in security - difficulties and complexity 
 Would be good for implementing a new security program 
 Definitions, an example and references are a very strong tool 
 Provoked how to better inform the risk appetites of lower level capabilities 
 Definitions and context provide scope but introduce flexibility in interpretation 
 Seeing all the elements together shows how broad security really is 
 Underpinned by standards shows a framework that can be usable 
 Very educational - pictorial models, artifact examples 
 Seeing it a such a high level demonstrates how hard it would be to coordinate  
 Would be an enhancement across the whole security spectrum 
 Saw security policies and practices can be used to form a cohesive framework 
 Introduced new aspects of security for me at the executive and business levels 
 A reminder of how complex security is 
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To get to the second phase, the first phase raw responses are reviewed and responses that are the 
same or have similar intent are combined, retaining the intent behind the theme. This reduces the 
number of responses, and distils the information thematically. The first coding process took a list 
of 13 responses to a total of eight response themes. 
 Definitions, an example and references are a very strong tool 
 Shows the full extent of issues involved in security - difficulties and complexity 
 Saw security policies and practices can be used to form a cohesive framework 
 Would be good for implementing a new security program 
 Provoked how to better inform the risk appetites of lower level capabilities 
 Very educational - pictorial models, artifact examples 
 Would be an enhancement across the whole security spectrum 
 Introduced new aspects of security for me at the executive and business levels 
 
The process or coding is done a second time, creating a third list of six response themes.  
 Definitions, artifacts, models and references are a very strong tool 
 Shows the full extent of issues involved in security - difficulties and complexity 
 Saw security policies and practices can be used to form a cohesive framework 
 Would be good for implementing a new security program 
 Provoked how to better inform the risk appetites of lower level capabilities 
 Introduced new aspects of security for me at the executive and business levels 
 
And finally, after the last iteration of distilling commonalities, the list of three dominant themes 
emerges from the original 13 responses. 
 Definitions, artifacts, models and references are a very strong tool 
 Shows the full extent of issues involved in security - risk, difficulties and complexity 
 Security policies and practices can be used to form a cohesive framework / security program 
 
Table 14 demonstrates the final thematic results for all of the questions in Section 2 of the survey 
using the grounded theory methodology.  
Artifact Survey Questions Grounded Theory Thematic Results 
Q1. What is the biggest security chal-
lenge facing organisations today? 
 Lack of risk management 
 Constrained cost environment 
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 Protection of ICT assets 
 Qualified and experienced security staff 
 Complete employee engagement 
 Company branding damage  
Q2. Referencing the background infor-
mation and the framework, please indi-
cate if you believe any security catego-
ries or elements are missing and should 
be included? 
 No new elements were identified 
Q3. Do you believe a holistic approach 
to security is likely to provide a more 
secure organisation? Why or why not? 
 Security is properly engaged across the business reduc-
ing risk of gaps 
 Organises the complete security function 
 Provides security education to new organisations 
 Provides a roadmap for decision makers towards secu-
rity assurance including resources 
Q4. Do you believe a holistic approach 
to security is likely to help with financial 
decision making for security resources? 
Why or why not? 
 Base financial decisions on security risk levels – highest 
risk gets attention it needs 
 Provide a basis for future security cost prediction and 
planning 
 Should include effects and costs of not doing each cell 
to highlight seriousness 
 Educate staff that all cells are not equal in terms of 
costs – the use of cells may indicate equality 
Q5. Does the use of a framework with 
all possible security categories included 
provide assurance to the process of se-
curing an organisation? Why or why 
not? 
 Yes – ensures all aspects of security are covered and 
assessed 
 Yes – allows for changes in the environment and 
emerging threats 
 Yes – teaches about security and guides the users 
 Yes – allows activities to be tracked, measured and 
monitored 
 No – complex and difficult to understand so will not 
feel assured 
Q6. After inputting an organisations 
security mechanisms into the frame-
 Yes – needs to address implementation and risk miti-
gation 
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work, cell by cell, do you believe you 
could see the security gaps in an organi-
sation and determine what else needs to 
be secured? Why or why not? 
 Yes – forces organisations to include security elements 
not traditionally addressed 
 Yes – provides good governance for security 
 Yes but would take a lot of resources to complete ac-
curately. 
Q7. Would the analysis from a com-
pleted security framework help senior 
management or the CEO make security 
decisions or provide beneficial man-
agement information? Please give an 
example. 
 Yes – provide understanding of the gaps in security, 
the risks and remediation 
 Yes – because it tiles the problems and solutions with 
the business value in the top row 
 Yes  - demonstrates the interconnected and broad na-
ture of security in a single nomenclature 
 Yes – aids cost efficiencies 
Q8. What do you see as the benefits or 
features of the framework for an organ-
isation using it? 
 Provides an as-is and a to-be so can create a plan for 
gap 
 Holistic comprehensive analysis of security – high level 
and detailed cell views 
 Roles and skill requirements are easy to define for each 
cell 
 Fits within the Enterprise Architecture of the organisa-
tion 
 Easier to assign accountability for security 
 Better communication about security between all levels 
of the organisation 
 Could provide profit and existential benefits 
Q9. What are the problems or challeng-
es of the framework for an organisation 
using it? Can they be solved? 
 Will initially require specialist resourcing or project 
team 
 Executive buy-in and support is key 
 Could be used as a check box instead of doing the 
thoughtful analysis 
 Quite complex 
 Human bias and resistance to change may be a prob-
lem 
Q10. This framework is compliant to 
NIST 800-53 and ISO27002 (interna-
 Yes – validates framework in terms of academic rigour 
 Yes – model based on best practice for company com-
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tional security industry standards). Does 
this information give you more confi-
dence in the framework? Is the compli-
ance important to you? 
pliance 
 Yes – management more likely to accept 
 No – risk based security is better than compliance 
based 
Q11. Is the framework easy to under-
stand and use? Why or why not? 
 Yes – may require education for non-security people  
 It is complex but intuitive, logical and easy to use 
 The examples help clarify what artifacts may look like 
and what to include 
 Yes – based on known and users best practice 
 Testing the framework within an organisation would 
help 
Q12. Does it help to have the security 
categories broken down into organisa-
tional levels (the row perspectives)? 
Why or why not? 
 The large number of boxes diminishes the simplicity of 
the approach 
 Helps to articulate each level’s security mechanisms, 
their responsibilities and considerations 
 The structural configuration shows that security is a 
whole of organisation responsibility not just ICT 
 Helps build trust because the right information is 
comprehensive and usable to the right audience 
Q13. Have you found the framework 
and the background information educa-
tional? Please give an example. 
 Definitions, artifacts, models and references make it a 
very strong tool 
 Show the full extent of issues involved in security – 
risk, difficulties and complexity 
 Security policies and practices can be used to form a 
cohesive framework / security program 
Q14. Please provide any final thoughts 
on the theory, framework and support-
ing documentation? 
 Include a simplified high level view, no pictures, 4-5 
words 
 The framework is scalable and adaptable to any organi-
sation 
 It is well researched, written and presented 
 Implementation would need to be centrally managed 
and championed by executive 
 Move the why (risk) column to after the what column 
to emphasise risk to executives 
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 Requires the practical implementation toolset such as a 
gap assessment workbook 
 This nomenclature holistically applied could be a key 
to success 
 Fantastic concept that provides a single awareness 
view for all about security 
 Could easily continue on and become a commercial 
product or products 
 A single framework that could be implemented and is 
industry standard compliant 
 Nice to see a table explaining how departments fit in 
where and what responsibilities 
 The artifact examples are extremely useful and the first 
thing to look for    
Table 14.  Thematic results per survey question from Grounded Theory analysis 
5.5 Summary 
In summary the artifact was evaluated by 12 expert participants using an Oppenheim survey. 
The results were analysed using the qualitative analysis tool, grounded theory method, and the 
results and anecdotal evidence supports the design and the artifact. Comments from the partici-
pants include “definitions, artifacts, models and references are a very strong tool”, “could easily 
continue on and become a commercial product” and “fantastic concept that provides a single 
awareness view for all security”. The next chapter will provide a discussion of the results generat-
ed from the evaluation of the survey including impact on design principles, new design 
knowledge gained from the research, and both theoretical and practical significance of the re-
search.  
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The research gap discussed in the Introduction highlighted the critical need for a new way to 
define security within organisations given the high number of breaches still occurring daily. Ap-
proaching security, instance by instance, within an organisation can create confusion, gaps and 
duplication of resources. There is a significant opportunity for a reduction of security breaches, 
increased economic security and cyber resilience in organisations through a holistic approach to 
an organisational security framework with methodological supporting documentation, the im-
portance and benefits of which have been mentioned in research (Anderson 2008; Moulton and 
Coles 2003). This research developed a novel, fully researched enterprise security architecture 
(ESA) framework for organisations. The framework, analysed by industry professionals, deter-
mines that a holistic security model can provide the much needed solution to the identified or-
ganisational security gaps and provide security benefits. The framework, the Security Architecture 
Framework for Enterprises (SAFE), is a comprehensive security solution based on the enterprise 
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architecture methodology and, through the research contribution, addresses the gap and the re-
search question by providing security benefits to an organisation more effectively than a piece-
meal approach. 
The research reviewed cohesive security frameworks or models available for organisations to use. 
The security framework literature review that was conducted, highlighted that a complete solu-
tion, addressing this gap was not currently available and as security has never been more im-
portant in this interconnected society, this significant gap was therefore worth pursuing. Through 
the review, this work discovered that the most effective and holistic construct for an organisa-
tional framework was enterprise architecture but found that, although previous iterations of secu-
rity frameworks using enterprise architecture had been attempted, there was no fully researched 
instance to test the theory of a holistic model and provide security benefits to an organisation 
more effectively than a piecemeal approach. Using Design Science Research, this research tested 
a design to address this gap and created an artifact for evaluation by experts.  The outcome of the 
evaluation, described in the previous chapter, was that the design does address the gap effectively 
and the holistic artifact could be used by organisations to improve their security profile more ef-
fectively than piecemeal approach. 
6.1 Thematic Interpretation of Results  
The purpose of the artifact was to test the design and design principles developed in support 
of the research question. The analysis of the expert evaluation responses provided insight as to 
the effectiveness of the design.  
The most common theme in the responses is the importance and utility of the holistic nature of 
the framework – demonstrating the interconnected and broad nature of security in a single no-
menclature. Of note was the ability of the framework to reduce the risk of security gaps, the cate-
gorisation of the complete security function, the uses including security governance, security pro-
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gram, best practice and a security nomenclature. Both the compliance to international standards 
and the holistic nature provide an assurance for company security certification. Comments by the 
participants include “compliance to NIST and ISO validates the framework in terms of academic 
rigour”, “ensures all aspects of security are covered and assessed”, “organises the complete secu-
rity function” and “focuses organisations to include security elements not traditionally ad-
dressed”. 
From a financial decision making perspective, the framework is said to provide a combination of 
a risk-based approach and ensures the highest security risks will get the highest priority spend. 
Comments by the participants include “provides a bases for future security cost prediction and 
planning” and “could provide profit and existential benefits”. 
Improved organisational communication in security is a theme that is cited as a significant benefit 
of the framework. Other benefits include defining who is accountable for security functions and 
the roles and skills of the security team defined which will provide better communication be-
tween all levels of the organisation, ensuring all aspects of security are covered and assessed. It is 
acknowledged several times that setting up this kind of model in an organisation will require sig-
nificant resourcing, including a project team, but once implemented and functioning it can be 
maintained. Comments by the participants include “provides better communication about securi-
ty between all levels of the organisation”, “provide an understanding of the gaps in security, the 
risks and remediation” and “provides good governance for security”. 
An educational theme for the framework is highlighted, that it will provide a security education 
for organisations. Security is a complex and difficult subject and the risks involved are high there-
fore using the framework can show the full extent of issues involved in security, something not 
easily known without a holistic tool. The framework is identified as a very strong educational tool 
based on the provided definitions, frameworks, models and references. Comments by the partici-
pants include “helps build trust because the right information is comprehensive and usable to the 
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right audience”, “security policies and practices can be used for a cohesive framework and securi-
ty program” and “the structural configuration shows that security is a whole of organisation re-
sponsibility not just IT”. 
A challenge of the framework is complexity. This is raised more than five times and through 
deeper analysis it is noted that the participants most challenged by the complexity of security do 
not have strong security experience. Comments from participants include “quite complex”, “the 
large number of boxes diminishes the simplicity of the approach”, “it is complex but is intuitive, 
logical and easy to use” and “scalable and adaptable to any organisation”.  
Other comments worthy of noting for the future evolution of the framework include the need 
for a practical implementation toolset such as a gap assessment workbook / a user manual, and 
testing the framework within an organisation. 
6.2 Results For Design Principles  
As first described in the Background and Literature Review chapter, the following five design 
principles were developed, after an analysis of 27 security frameworks, to guide the design of the 
artifact. Each principle, as described in the Evaluation chapter, was then aligned to specific sur-
vey questions given to the participants, to test the artifact’s application and efficacy to the princi-
ples and the research question. The following discussion describes the participant results to the 
questions related to the Principles. Table 13 provides the direct mapping of the principles to the 
survey questions. The outcome shows an effective implementation of the Principles in guiding 
the design of the framework and the responses indicate that such an artifact would provide sig-
nificant organisational security benefits more effectively than a piecemeal approach which suc-
cessfully answers the research question. 
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Principle 1 – Security mechanisms for all organisational assets 
Survey questions two, three, six and seven were designed to test the principle that all organisa-
tional assets should be assessed for security mechanisms, noting that all security is risk based and 
therefore the answer can be that the organisation chooses not to secure the asset and accepts the 
risk, but the key is that all assets – people, process, technology and information, should be con-
sidered in the securing of an organisation. The participants indicated in question two that the arti-
fact was very comprehensive and there were no organisational assets missing from the artifact 
grid. To support this notion, the third question asked if a holistic approach – all assets, all de-
partments, is likely to provide a more secure organisation. The responses were 100% in agree-
ment with this question. One participant expanded further and explained how often media de-
scribes the extent an organisation will spend time and money on securing one part of an organisa-
tion, such as ICT, and the successful attack is in an area that was treated as less important or re-
ceived less focus, such as physical security. The best security can be applied to a computer but if 
the attacker can simply walk away with the computer, then the organisational security has failed. 
Questions six and seven focused on the potential gap analysis that is required to ensure all assets 
are secured and the executive buy-in that is required to make those security decisions. Partici-
pants highlighted that the ontological nature of the grid – a list of security terms and the relation-
ships between them, gives an organisation a complete list to work through to conduct the gap 
analysis and then bring the needs or risk choices to the executive to make a decision. The frame-
work also demonstrates the interconnected system of security and the subsequent consequences 
of softening one aspect. It was also highlighted that the framework would provide an assurance 
to management that the recommendations they bring are based on a methodology.    
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Principle 2 – Ontological phrases are used 
Survey questions two, five and 12 were designed to test the principle of ontological security 
phrases rather than instances of a security mechanism. The ontological design principle provides 
flexibility to the users that the requirement for instances would not. For example if an organisa-
tion is required to have a specified type of physical security such as a retina scanner for biometric 
screening of visitors to the building but the organisation is only 10 people, it is unlikely that the 
organisation could afford or actually need such a large scale form of physical security. The use of 
the ontological phrase for physical security such as “identity and access management” from the 
artifact, emphasises to the organisation that physical security is required to be considered but the 
instance type is not mandated, allowing all organisation types, sizes and budgets to use the arti-
fact. The responses from the participants indicated the categories allowed their subject matter 
experts, like physical security, to determine the best implementation for their organisation. It was 
also highlighted that the ontological phrases not being prescriptive allowed for flexibility and 
change when the organisational environment changed, such as growth or structure, or new 
threats emerged in the security environment. One participant mentioned that the categories were 
encouraging to their small organisation and that they felt they were more likely to achieve a level 
of security assurance because categories were achievable but previous prescriptive instance-based 
frameworks they had tried to implement had been too costly, difficult and as a small organisation 
they did not have the expertise, leaving the organisation exposed to significant security risk. 
Principle 3 – Compliance to security industry standard 
Survey questions two, five and 10 were designed to test the principle that it is important for the 
artifact to be in compliance with at least one security industry standard. In the literature review it 
was determined that the two most commonly used standards for security were ISO/IEC 27002 
and NIST 800-53. The artifact was therefore designed to be in compliance with both of these 
standards and the survey questions were designed to understand the importance of compliance 
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and assurance to organisations. Participants highlighted the two standards as best practice and 
therefore the framework, by association, would also be perceived as best practice and  the use of 
a framework that was in compliance would aid in security audits as most audits now require 
compliance to pass. It was also noted that there is a level of credibility associated with standards, 
that it builds more confidence in the benefits and provenance of the framework, and this would 
lend a credibility to security programs and also to conversations with executive about security.  
Principle 4 – Use of an enterprise architecture reference 
Survey questions four, seven, eight and 12 were designed to test the principle that the use of en-
terprise architecture as the primary model for the foundation of the framework is an effective 
choice. Enterprise architecture was chosen for two key reasons. The first is that EA was the most 
commonly used model for security frameworks when the review of 27 frameworks was done. 
Secondly EA adheres to and supports Principle 1 and Principle 5 directly and indirectly supports 
Principle 2 and 3 because EA is a model to build a complete organisation. In the same way, the 
research question and design principles were intended to develop a whole organisational security 
framework, not just for a department or a specific type of security.    
The responses from participants discussed the importance of articulation of security mechanisms, 
including responsibilities for all levels of the organisation, the use of the architectural categories 
would provide the right information to the best people to understand it, and the rows and col-
umns break up the complexity of security into identifiable chunks. The use of EA was also men-
tioned as helpful because large numbers of organisations are turning to EA to define the best use 
of their resources and having a security framework based on EA will complement, align and im-
plement the organisations business models more effectively.  Another response noted the use of 
a multi-faceted model like EA, aids understanding that security is also multi-faceted and that each 
department has something to contribute in the decision making and execution of security – fun-
damentally security is a whole-of-organisation responsibility. 
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Principle 5 – Coverage is organisationally holistic 
Survey questions three, four, six and seven were designed to test the principle that security should 
be considered in all departments of an organisation and not just individual departments like ICT 
and that all security in an organisation should be cohesively considered and managed not as sepa-
rate departmental responsibilities or instances. The most frequent response to these survey ques-
tions was about the framework helping the organisations understand the other parts of the organ-
isation that need security. By taking a holistic view, there was an educational factor involved, and 
security would be considered and implemented in areas that had not previously been considered, 
effectively closing security gaps and minimising risk. Mapping all of an organisations security in 
the single model provides a view of security that had not previously been available and changes 
the perspective of security in an organisation from the singular departmental focus to an organi-
sationally holistic security eco-system with highly interdependent primitive security models. With-
in the eco-system concept, the framework also provides a depiction of the essential relationships 
between the cells for business security modelling. The consequences highlighted the contribu-
tions and future work made possible by the framework with respondents mentioning better secu-
rity coverage, strong gap analysis and therefore remediation, departmental responsibility defini-
tion and considered security decision making in understanding the organisation’s risk exposure. A 
holistic view of an organisation’s security is a balanced view of security and directly drives re-
source discussions where ICT or physical security is usually the focus.    
6.3 New Design Knowledge  
Within DSR, there are eight components of a design that are used to describe the design 
knowledge that was gained during research in the design process and the resulting artifact 
(Gregor and Jones 2007).  The purpose of this component structure is to “specify design theory 
so that it can be communicated, justified and developed cumulatively” (Gregor and Jones 2007). 
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Table 15 uses this schema to communicate the summary of the new design knowledge contribu-
tions within this research, evaluated through the artifact - the security architecture framework for 
enterprises.  
Component Type SAFE Component Concepts 
Purpose and scope The research question for this work is to determine if a holistic security 
model, using enterprise architecture, provides security benefits to an 
organisation more effectively than a piecemeal approach.  
The model or framework is for evaluation by industry experts to con-
sider in terms of their own organisations and expertise. The framework 
is applicable to organisation of all sizes, budget and staffing levels. Prin-
ciples of utility and design were considered.   
Constructs Incremental development using the evaluative responses. Compliance 
to industry security standards. Organisational security cohesion. Securi-
ty benefits such as education, responsibility allocation and financial de-
cision guidance. 
Principles of form and function A security architecture framework that includes all perspectives of an 
organisation - scope, business, system, technology, tools and opera-
tions. An organisational security ontology. 
Artifact mutability To aid complexity a practical implementation toolset such as gap as-
sessment workbook or user manual. 
Testable propositions Further testing of the design in using a longitudinal study to assess the 
changes in security. 
Justificatory knowledge The kernel theory was enterprise architecture. 
Principles of implementation An architect would use all 36 cells of the framework as a guide to de-
scribe the security profile of the organisation. For each cell the organi-
sation would decide if an instance of the cell exists or if not, are they 
willing to accept the risk of not having it and will it be mitigated. For 
use by organisations with and without Zachman implementations. 
Expository instantiation The instantiation of the design is the security architecture framework 
for enterprises artifact. 
Table 15.  Components of a design theory for the artifact (Gregor and Jones 2007) 
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Theoretical Significance   
The kernel knowledge for this research was the domain of enterprise architecture. As described 
in the Background and Literature Review chapter, EA is an established, comprehensive body of 
knowledge and models that are used to describe an organisation and its assets.  Until this research 
and design study was conducted, security within EA had not been considered with the same 
depth as EA. There were other frameworks that used some of the principles of EA to describe 
security but none that strictly adhered to EA and all of its principles, and then used a fully re-
searched process to create an artifact. This increased the novelty of the research and the outcome 
in both the artifact, the design and the evaluation, all indicate success to the extension of the ker-
nel theory. There now exists a true enterprise security architecture framework and design princi-
ples to guide future users and researchers. 
Similarly, the security domain is also well established, however, there are very few models that 
address all forms of security within an organisation in a structured format that is fully compliant 
with industry standards. The collection of the security categories as a framework is also a form of 
ontology or categorisation system for organisational security. This research has extended the se-
curity domain body of knowledge by creating a design that provides both an ontology and a 
model for all organisations regardless of their size, budget or resources. The use of the frame-
work as an ontology provides shareable and reusable knowledge across the security domain or an 
organisation using the framework, and, as Zachman recommends, describe the relationships and 
connections between the cells, or the organisational security instances, which can be used for 
business modelling. This form of business security modelling has not been available before and 
changes the perspective of security in an organisation from the piecemeal approach to a holistic 
security eco-system with highly interdependent primitive security models.  
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Practical Significance  
The evaluation indicates that all participants believe their practice of security within their organi-
sations would be significantly improved if such a design were available. As described in the evalu-
ation by the expert participants, the opportunities to improve organisational security using the 
design and artifact include management, financial resourcing, security education, compliance ob-
ligations and audit, risk management and security awareness and confidence. Within the practice 
of securing organisations, which the artifact was designed to address, the implications to practice 
indicate the gap has been bridged through convincing evidence. Respondents from the survey 
agree, “security is intrinsically linked and best practice should be holistic”, “the holistic approach 
provides a recognition by Boards and Executive Management that security is a business risk, not 
a technical risk”, “shows the full extent of security issues”, “a holistic approach will be very pow-
erful in any organisation”, “demonstrates the interconnected nature of security in a single no-
menclature” and “it ties the problems and solutions with the business value”. 
6.4 Summary  
Through the evaluation of the artifact by expert respondents, we learned that the artifact and 
its design directly addresses the research question “Will a holistic security model, using EA, pro-
vide security benefits to an organisation more effectively than a piecemeal approach?”  The con-
tributions of this research include providing a clear link between a holistic security approach and 
the organisational security benefits by developing and testing a framework that addresses these 
concerns. The research also demonstrates the interconnected nature of security in a single no-
menclature, supports financial decision making, provides educational benefits, demonstrates as-
surance to organisational compliance, improved communication within organisations, and pro-
vides an organisation’s structural configuration for better understanding. The five guiding design 
principles, when used effectively in a framework implementation do address the research ques-
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tion and gap. And finally this research changes the way we fundamentally view security in an or-
ganisation, from individual silo capabilities to a holistic security eco-system with highly interde-
pendent primitive security models.  
The conclusions discussed in the next chapter will summarise the thesis, confirm the findings and 
that the research gap has been bridged; and provide a recommended way forward for the re-
search domain and future works. 
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Security has never been more important to our connected world and to organisations, with the 
number of security breaches increasing every year and the high profile discussions of security is-
sues in the media. A new approach to organisational security is a priority. In security, the whole is 
clearly greater than the sum of its parts and security maturity is not just technical but involves 
consideration of all parts of the organisation in a holistic manner. The benefits of a holistic ap-
proach require all aspects of security to be considered and risk managed based on the budget, size 
and mechanisms of the organisation, and provides a reduction in responsibility confusion and 
appropriate resourcing, would reduce security breaches and improve security factors in organisa-
tions.  This research has designed a new holistic model for organisations to address security and 
the evaluation results indicate the research gap and practical organisational need have been 
achieved.    
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The research conducted a semi-systematic literature review of 27 organisational security struc-
tures to determine if a fully researched and holistic security methodology was available. The sur-
vey analysis showed that current security models lack research process and therefore lack case 
study analysis, replicability and research exploration.  This was identified by a careful examination 
and review of the 27 security structures, their supporting documentation and the methodologies 
used. The result is very few structures met the holistic test and the most common construct to 
address an organisation holistically was Enterprise Architecture (EA). Furthermore, one of the 
important findings in the survey was the ontology gap. EA uses an ontology to describe the or-
ganisational classifications, simplifying structures for use. Organisational security does not cur-
rently have this classification structure. The development of an Enterprise Security Architecture 
(ESA) ontology is the first of its kind and provides an ESA language to articulate security in all its 
forms throughout an organisation. The structure can be used for compliance and assurance pur-
poses, providing management with a tangible solution to the fiduciary and moral responsibilities 
of organisational security. The need for further research was highlighted.  
Our analysis identified the similarities and differences amongst the frameworks and proposed a 
set of design principles to guide the development of a security artifact. The design principles for 
the artifact were: 1) the securing of all assets, 2) the use of ontological phrases, 3) compliance to 
international security standards, 4) the use of EA as the reference model and 5) organisationally 
holistic in its implementation.  The principles respect the key aspects of the two domains of secu-
rity and enterprise architecture and provided a first step towards effectively combining them for 
the new artifact. The resulting research question was therefore: 
Will a holistic security model, using Enterprise Architecture, provide security benefits to an organisation more 
effectively than a piecemeal approach? 
The design of a holistic enterprise security architecture highlights that security is not just technical 
but requires a focusing on all the organisational assets of people, technology, processes and in-
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formation, which provides enterprise security management guidance to contemporary digitalised 
organisations of the 21st Century. 
This research used the Design Science Research methodology due to the need for a designed and 
evaluated artifact. The qualitative analysis of an Oppenheim questionnaire given to expert evalua-
tors to provide feedback for the artifact, was completed using the Grounded Theory Method, 
and the approach of the research was constructivist and inductive.  
The designed and fully researched artifact produced in this work is the Security Architecture 
Framework for Enterprises (SAFE) (Figure 9) and is based on the Zachman 2013 Version 3.0 
EA construct which allows for the artifact to be used in conjunction with the Zachman EA or as 
a stand-alone organisational security model. SAFE is compliant with the five guiding design prin-
ciples identified in the initial literature review and has been completed to three layers of abstrac-
tion including; the primitive security models - row / column categories; the security instantiations 
of the primitive security models - detailed security definitions; and the ontological security cell 
definitions - pictorial model, artifact example and compliance mapping.  The completed artifact is 
a 6 x 6 framework and each cell was defined using 1) a detailed explanation, 2) pictorial model, 3) 
artifact example in the real world and 4) compliance mapping to ISO 27002 and NIST 800-53.  
To determine the effectiveness of the framework in meeting security concerns and test the effica-
cy within real-world organisational environments, the framework and supporting documentation 
is shared with industry professionals together with a questionnaire for evaluation and asked them 
to consider the artifact in the context of their own organisations and expertise. The questionnaire 
was made up of five demographic questions about the participants and 14 questions about the 
artifact. The participants were made up of managers, security professionals, IT professionals and 
researchers. The questions about the artifact were mapped to the five design principles and the 
research question, and were designed to elicit meaningful responses to further guide the devel-
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opment and usability of the design and the artifact.  The responses were analysed using the quali-
tative analysis methodology, Grounded Theory. 
The analysis of the questionnaire responses evaluating the security artifact, SAFE, indicates that 
the research gap has been bridged and that a holistic approach to organisational security, using 
EA, can provide security benefits more effectively than a piecemeal approach. The evaluation 
highlighted the usability of a holistic structure which demonstrates to the organisation, the inter-
connectedness and broad nature of security. Other benefits included reduction of security gaps, a 
categorisation framework for the entire security function, security governance structure, im-
proved security program, compliance to best practice and a security nomenclature. Other oppor-
tunities include better financial decision making for the security function, improved organisation-
al communication regarding security, and a strong educational tool for the organisation with the 
use of the provided definitions, framework, models and references.  One challenge to non-
security practitioners was the complexity of the artifact and a recommendation for a future im-
provement of the framework was a gap assessment workbook or user manual.  
The theoretical significance of this research is the successful extension of the kernel theory, en-
terprise architecture, with a fully researched enterprise security architecture including all defini-
tions and the five design principles successfully implemented. The security domain has benefited 
by the development of the first security categorisation system for organisations or an organisa-
tional security ontology. 
To mature the concept further there would be benefit from future work to explore further the 
ideas discussed in this research. The first recommendation would be a larger design study – the 
analysis of a larger study could provide a larger sample size of the input data to provide detailed 
focus areas for additional research and further application to business units. Secondly a user 
guide or manual was identified in this research as being particularly important to non-security 
professionals, the creation and inclusion of one would therefore extend the usability of the 
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framework beyond experts to a much wider audience, improving security architectures more 
broadly. A case study in an organisation would test the efficacy of the framework and provide 
practical nuances and adjustments to the work that research cannot. Finally an organisational im-
plementation study would take the case study concept further and provide longitudinal data as 
the organisation implemented and changed through the use of the framework. In both the organ-
isational case study and implementation study, it would be useful to work with multiple organisa-
tions and therefore capture data from varying types of organisations to test the applicability of 
the framework despite the relevant industry or sector. 
This work is important because organisational security has never been more necessary and the 
successful design and development of a security framework artifact that looks at all of the aspects 
of security throughout an organisation is an important step forward to achieve a comprehensive 
solution to a complex and challenging problem for our digital society. This research changes the 
way we fundamentally view security in an organisation, from individual silo capabilities to a holis-
tic security eco-system with highly interdependent primitive security models.  The success of this 
important security research provides an opportunity and a significant foundation for future ESA 
studies.   
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